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Abstract
The  primary  aim  of  this  essay  is  to  present  and  defend  "virtualism"  – 
essentially, the claim that the brain is a virtual reality engine, meaning that the 
world of experience is,  literally,  a virtual reality somehow computationally 
generated by the brain. The most challenging objection to this theory is that it 
undermines  itself  by  having  to  admit  its  own  virtuality,  i.e.,  untruth.  In 
preparing my defence against this, I introduce "epistemological fctionalism" 
as an attempt at establishing a frst philosophy based on global skepticism, 
inspired  in  particular  by  the  ancient  skeptics  and  George  Santayana.  The 
entire  frst  part  of  the  essay's  two  parts  deals  with  epistemological 
fctionalism, the problem of justifying belief in general, and my reply to the 
objection that virtualism is self-undermining. In the second part, virtualism is 
fnally  expounded,  and  a  wide  range  of  philosophical  consequences  are 
explored. In most of what I discuss here, I rely heavily on Antti Revonsuo and 
Thomas Metzinger. 
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Introduction
The assumption that the brain works something like a computer has been at the core 
of cognitive science since its inception around the middle of the 20th century. It has  
shaped  or  reshaped  a  wide range  of  other  felds  of  study,  including  psychology, 
neuroscience, evolutionary biology and, of course, AI research. What philosophers 
have contributed have mainly been arguments either for or against the claim that the 
mind can, in principle, be reduced to physical events in the brain1. But completely 
inverse  to  this  approach,  there  is  a  much  more  philosophically  (as  opposed  to 
scientifcally) signifcant perspective to be found, where mind rather than physical 
reality is granted primacy. The problem then shifts from the ability of physical stuff to 
produce mind to the ability of mental stuff to produce the appearance of physical 
stuff in experience – or rather, the appearance of the entire physical universe. This 
perspective  is  perfectly  well  supported  by  the  computationalist  assumption:  If 
everything mental really is the computational product of biological mechanisms in 
the brain, then the world we experience and describe as a physical world wholly 
external  to  us  must  be  considered,  literally,  a  virtual  reality –  a  model  rendered 
somehow  by  mostly  unconscious  internal  processes,  based  on  sensory  input. 
Presumably,  this  had  the  original  evolutionary  function  of  making  it  as  easy  as 
possible for organisms like ours to move about and fnd what they need to survive 
and  reproduce,  but  the  same  capacity  has  given  us  fantastical  byproducts,  like 
dreams and free speculative thought.  A wide variety of prominent scientists have 
pointed out this alternative perspective, or even relies directly on it in their research 2. 
But  the task of exploring its ramifcations and theoretical  justifcation is generally 
seen  as  too  speculative  for  empirical  science,  and  is  passed  on  to  philosophers, 
exceedingly few of which have taken it  up, at least not explicitly in terms of this 
analogy between mind and virtuality. I have found two major exceptions to this: the 
1 For instance: John Searle, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, Hilary Putnam.
2 Scientists who have pointed it out include, in no particular order, the biologist Richard Dawkins  
(2000: chapter 11), the cognitive neuroscientist Antti Revonsuo (2006: chapter 6), the neuroscientist  
Rodolfo Llinás (2002), the neurologist and AI researcher Henry Markram (director of IBM's Blue 
Brain Project, which has the long term goal of building an artifcial human brain using biologically  
realistic models of neurons) and the theoretical physicist David Deutsch (1998: chapter 5).
– 3 –
philosophically minded cognitive neuroscientist Antti Revonsuo and the philosopher 
Thomas  Metzinger.  These  thinkers  present,  in  great  detail,  exactly  the  kinds  of 
general theories I would like to see,  and even ones that very closely resemble the 
theory I will introduce in the second part of this essay as "virtualism". I rely heavily 
on them both in elaborating what I think this metaphysical position involves. But 
what neither of them provide is a thorough argument for how their theories escape 
logical contradiction. If it is the case that we can only experience virtual worlds – if 
nothing we can think or perceive can reach out from inside the virtual realm into a 
truly external reality – then any theory that states these things must necessarily itself 
be just another construct among constructs. More succinctly put, their theories and 
my own,  all  of  which involve  metaphysical  claims,  deny the  possibility  that  any 
metaphysical claim can be true! This seems to be a blatant self-contradiction, and it is 
not clear how Metzinger and Revonsuo resolve this issue. The entire frst part of this 
essay's two parts will be devoted to presenting my solution to this problem. In short, 
I will show that this particular contradiction is not an unacceptable one; rather, it is to 
be viewed as a welcome reminder about the limitations of speculative thought. This 
conclusion is made possible by a fundamental perspectival shift from epistemological  
realism (belief in the attainability of true knowledge) to epistemological  fctionalism 
based  on  radical  skepticism.  What  I  hope  will  be  arrived  at  by  this  route  is  a 
convincing theoretical foundation for speculative thought in general, on the basis of 
which the claim that virtualism is self-undermining can be rejected.
Much  of  the  topic  has  been  extensively  traversed  already  much  before  the 
computationalist assumption was made possible by technological advance. In fact, 
the basic claims of virtualism, stripped of their computational terminology, constitute 
a recurrent theme in the history of philosophy since the Presocratics. When the focus 
has been on the negative conclusion that we cannot truly know anything beyond the 
realm of our own mental fabrication, it has been called skepticism. When the focus 
has been on the fabric,  it  has sometimes been called idealism or phenomenology. 
When the focus has been on the developmental origins of our capacity to create for 
ourselves a coherent and meaningful world, it has been called genetic constructivism. 
And so on. In my opinion, these traditions should not be construed as separate, but 
as aspects of one and the same major topic running through the entire history of 
philosophy – or at least as attempts which in retrospect can rightly be understood as 
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being in the same vein. For this reason, I will make almost indiscriminate use of both 
historical  sources  and  ones  that  explicitly  make  use  of  the  computationalist 
assumption.
In the frst part of the essay, I will introduce epistemological fctionalism and argue 
that it  is  a viable frst philosophy.  I  will  explain how it  relates to skepticism and 
virtualism, and discuss the consequences of relinquishing truth as a criterion for the 
acceptance or rejection of thoughts and perceptions. How to justify belief in general 
becomes a major problem, and I will offer my refections on this issue.
In the second part, I will give a more comprehensive presentation of virtualism and 
its philosophical consequences.  The core issues will be introduced in terms of the 
dreaming brain as a model system for the study of consciousness. A useful distinction 
between  real  and  virtual  truth  will  be  established,  and  I  will  suggest  that  the 
confusion of these two concepts of truth is the pivotal reason for the realist mistake. 
Another  major  topic  will  be  the  nature  of  the  virtual  self  and  our  concept  of 
transcendental  subjectivity.  Finally,  I  explore  a  few  possible  consequences  of  the 
virtualist perspective at a further speculative distance, for how we should think of 
fctionalist religion, culture in general, and the future of humanity.
– 5 –
Part I: Epistemological fctionalism
In modern philosophy, before the upheavals of the 20th Century, the defnition of 
truth as correspondence to reality was generally seen as self-evident. But it was far 
from unproblematic,  the main worry being that  it  led to skepticism.  As Berkeley 
expressed it in his Principles of Human Knowledge:
we  have  been  led  into  very  dangerous  errors,  by  supposing  a  twofold 
existence of the objects of sense, the one intelligible or in the mind, the other 
real and without the mind, whereby unthinking things are thought to have a 
natural subsistence of their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits. This 
which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and absurd 
notion, is the very root of scepticism. For so long as men thought that real 
things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far 
forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows, they could not be 
certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that 
the  things,  which  are  perceived,  are  conformable  to  those  which  are  not 
perceived or exist without the mind? (2008: 117)
Skepticism was to Berkeley an absolutely intolerable result,  and the only way he 
could see to avoid it was to eliminate from the equation the conventional assumption 
that matter exists independently of mind – this was the starting point of his infamous 
“immaterialism”.
Kant  saw  himself  forced  by  the  same  problem  to  develop  his  own  radical  and 
counterintuitive  solution.  As  expressed  in  one  of  his  last  published  books, 
Introduction to Logic: 
Truth  is  said  to  consist  in  the  agreement  of  knowledge  with  the  object. 
According to this mere verbal defnition, then, my knowledge, in order to be 
true, must agree with the object. Now, I can only compare the object with my 
knowledge by this means, namely, by taking knowledge of it. My knowledge, 
then, is to be verifed by itself, which is far from being suffcient for truth. For 
as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge 
whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object. 
(1972: 40)
Kant acknowledged that the skeptics were right about our inability to reach beyond 
mere appearances, but only because he saw that the realm of appearances was far 
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from as cognitively barren as its bad philosophical reputation would have it. In fact, 
what  he  found  was  that  the  sought-for  fnal,  objective,  communicable,  and  yet 
undogmatic determination of empirical objects could only be arrived at here. For even 
though appearances are all we can experience, the very possibility of experience has,  
according to Kant, certain a priori, necessary and objective formal conditions, on the 
basis of which a stable empirical reality that can be the object of scientifc inquiry can 
be established. Hence, what Kant attempts to do, in his  Critique of Pure Reason, is to 
map out the a priori determinable absolute borders of this merely empirical domain – 
and  by  that  lay  the  foundation  for  both  philosophical  and  empirical  thought  in 
general.
The philosophical  constructions  of  both Berkeley and Kant  thus begin with their 
attempts to evade or mitigate the skeptical consequence that follows from refection 
on the defnition of truth as correspondence to reality. But neither of their solutions is 
satisfying. A different approach is needed in frst philosophy, and, as I will argue in 
this part, that approach can and should be based on radical skepticism. Before I get to 
that,  however,  I'd like to briefy explain why I  think the philosophical projects of 
Berkeley and Kant both fail. These reasons will, in turn, lead straight into the issues 
that need to be addressed by my epistemologically fctionalist alternative.
Where the alternative solutions are fawed
First, a few words against a crucial point in Berkeley's radical idealism: Contrary to 
what  Berkeley  assumes,  the  belief  in  a  reality  external  to  mind  and  perception, 
material or not, can be perfectly well justifed despite the impossibility of verifying 
the truth of this belief,  simply by appealing to a different criterion for belief than 
truth.  The belief  would then have to  be qualifed as merely  hypothetical,  and any 
metaphysical theory that involves it would simply inherit this status. Hypothetical 
metaphysics  is  not a contradiction in  terms:  The limits  of  verifcation are not the 
limits of metaphysics. In fact, as I will argue, metaphysics is and must be inherently 
speculative.
Where epistemological fctionalism departs from Kant is in the strict necessity and 
epistemic fnality he claims of the a priori conditions of experience. Against this, the 
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fctionalist holds that all structural elements of our experience must be considered 
fundamentally  arbitrary  –  something  that  is  best  illustrated  by  the  following 
plausible naturalist explanation: what seems to be an unbreakable epistemic order is 
an illusion caused by circumstantial adaptational optimization of the way our brain 
generates  an  experiential  world.  This  internally  constructed  order,  the 
epistemological  fctionalist  holds,  can  (at  least  in  principle)  be  circumvented  or 
further improved at every point. The empirical reality that Kant operated with was 
simply not as fxed as he asserted. It turned out to be just a model, and is no longer a  
particularly useful one: With modern physics, the absolute limits he determined for 
this empirical reality have long since been transgressed; new models concerning the 
nature of time, space, causality, substance and so on have rendered his framework 
obsolete.  And although there  might  be a  case to  be made  that  his  description of 
empirical  reality  has  some  purchase  on  our  unrefected  experience  or  intuitive 
understanding of reality, resorting to that would greatly diminish the philosophical 
signifcance of his system, to such an extent that it would be mostly irrelevant to any 
epistemology that aims at serving the function of frst philosophy. I personally do not 
think that such a case can be convincingly made, but arguing the point would be to 
digress from the issue at hand.
Many later philosophers have opted to abandon correspondence theory altogether to 
evade the problem of skepticism. But this seems to me deeply unphilosophical. Even 
though correspondence  is  an arbitrary,  "merely  verbal"  defnition  of  truth,  it  is  a 
profound  one,  and  should  not  be  shunned  for  the  sake  of  comfort.  That  said, 
skepticism is not anywhere near as destructive and uncomfortable as it is generally 
regarded. As demonstrated by among others Ernst von Glasersfeld (2002) and George 
Santayana (1955), skepticism is only a dead end to thinkers with realist assumptions 
or expectations. To an epistemological fctionalist on the other hand3,  it is  the only 
legitimate starting point for philosophy, and even a superabundantly fertile one: 
a  mind  enlightened  by  scepticism  and  cured  of  noisy  dogma,  a  mind 
discounting all reports,  and free from all  tormenting anxiety about its own 
fortunes or existence, fnds in the wilderness of essence [here equivalent to 
3 "Epistemological fctionalism" is a term of my own invention, hence none of the thinkers I draw on 
could have explicitly approved of it. As for von Glasersfeld and Santayana, I believe they would 
both object to the term, but not for reasons that go much deeper than terminological preferences. 
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what I call fction] a very sweet and marvellous solitude. The ultimate reaches 
of doubt and renunciation open out for it, by an easy transition, into felds of 
endless variety and peace, as if through the gorges of death it had passed into 
a paradise where all things are crystallised into the image of themselves, and 
have lost their urgency and their venom. (Santayana, 1955: 76)
Skepticism
If we take skepticism seriously, we cannot truthfully postulate the real existence of 
anything. This is where the realist sees a risk of falling into abysmal nihilism. But is it  
really  necessary  to  secure  our  cognitive  arrival  at  real  existence?  Supposing 
skepticism is true, we can still operate with the full depth of experience and thought. 
We can still seek and fnd explanatory patterns in our experience, and postulate the 
existence not only of reality as such, but of specifc objects and events with specifc 
attributes. However, all such postulation will have to be qualifed as speculative. This 
is where the term "fction" comes in. A fction is something supposed not to be true, 
but which one nevertheless can invest belief in, as an act of immersion.
Parmenides  said,  "one  cannot  think of  what  is  not";  –  we are at  the  other 
extreme,  and  say  "what  can  be  thought  of  must  certainly  be  a  fction." 
(Nietzsche, 1968: 291)
This use of  the term fction has no direct  historical precedence.  The Kant scholar 
Hans Vaihinger comes closest, where he in his  Philosophy of As-If restores fctions to 
dignity  across  the  cultural  spectrum,  from  hard  science  to  religion.  But  he 
understands  them  in  a  more  conventional  sense,  and  contrasts  them  with 
"hypotheses",  which,  although  he  defnes  them  as  "ideational  constructs",  clearly 
have a realist hope attached:
[A hypothesis] submits its reality to the test and demands verifcation, i.e. it 
wants to be proved true, real, and an expression of a reality. Every hypothesis 
without exception endeavours to establish a reality, and even though we are 
still  uncertain  as  to  the  actual  occurrence  of  something  hypothetically 
assumed, we yet entertain the hope that the assumption will eventually prove 
to be true. (2009: 85)
In  skeptically  based  epistemological  fctionalism  this  realist  hope  is  denied,  and 
accordingly  there  is  no  longer  any  reason  to  distinguish  between  fctions  and 
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hypotheses.  In  my use,  these  terms are  interchangeable.  Scientifc  hypotheses  are 
viewed as merely one particular sort of fctional constructs.
In Greek antiquity, although the term fction had no verbal equivalent (Ferrari, 1989: 
98),  there  emerged  a  view that  very  much resembles  what  I  call  epistemological 
fctionalism,  in   the  two  closely  related  skeptical  traditions  now  referred  to  as 
Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism. The latter, which emerged in Plato's Academy 
a century after Plato, grew out of doubts about the Stoics'  claim that the absolute 
truth  of  being  was  graspable  by  the  sage.  Arcesilaus,  the  sixth  scholarch  of  the 
Academy and the  one that  instituted  skepticism,  seems to  have been  exclusively 
focused on its negative moment.  The story of his successorship is one of gradual 
development of  a  positive epistemology as well,  until  Philo of  Larissa  effectively 
ended the tradition one and a half century later by having the Academy relapse into 
dogmatism.  The  step  in  this  positive  development  that  most  resembles 
epistemological fctionalism is the one introduced by Carneades, the Academy's tenth 
scholarch, who was later categorized by Sextus Empiricus as the founder of its Third 
era4. What he contributed was the introduction of pithanon as an acceptable criterion 
for  belief,  a  term  Cicero  later  mistranslated  into  latin  as  "probabile",  causing 
Carneadean  epistemology  to  be  called  probabilist.  But  "what  the  word  normally 
means  in  Greek  is  'persuasive'  or  'convincing,'  and  Carneades  defned  a  pithane 
impression  as  one  which  appears  true"  (Burnyeat,  1983:  123).  In  other  words, 
Carneadean epistemology was not probabilist at all. A more ftting term for it, at least 
in my view, is fctionalist epistemology.
In the problematic criterion of  pithanon and the misunderstandings that surrounded 
it, we have a curious foreshadowing of both the central message of epistemological 
fctionalism and the diffculties met in trying to convey it. I will explore these issues 
through  simultaneously  defending  Carneadean  skepticism  and  my  own 
epistemological fctionalism against three major objections raised against the former 
since antiquity, and expected to be raised in the reader's mind against the latter as 
well:
4 Diogenes  Laërtius  and  Cicero  had  different  suggestions  for  how  to  categorize  the  Academy's 
history, both of whom incidentally placed Carneades in what they called the New Academy.
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1. The apraxia objection: that if skepticism were taken seriously, that is, if all truth 
judgments were withheld,  it  would render people unable  to  carry on with 
their daily lives.
2. The  objection  that  skepticism  is  incoherent  or  self-contradictory,  since  the 
claim that nothing can be known itself seems to be a knowledge claim.
3. The objection that skepticism leads to solipsism – supposedly a  reductio  ad 
absurdum argument. 
The apraxia objection
That Carneadean skepticism is unaffected by the frst objection is already evident: 
even though he denies the possibility of true knowledge, he can nevertheless assent 
to claims on the basis of their  apparent plausibility.  He suffers no more diffculty 
living than a  Stoic  does.  The main reason  I  think the  apraxia  objection  is  still  so 
infuential is that the nihilist caricature of skepticism is such a wonderfully extreme 
position, tempting to set up as a straw man position to distance oneself from. David 
Hume, for example, when presenting the  apraxia  objection in his  Enquiry concerning 
Human Understanding,  gives a very infuential caricature of Pyrrhonism. And even 
though Carneadean skepticism is our main concern here,  this does deserve a few 
remarks. Hume's words:
a  Pyrrhonian  cannot  expect,  that  his  philosophy  will  have  any  constant 
infuence on the mind: Or if it had, that its infuence would be benefcial to 
society.  On  the  contrary,  he  must  acknowledge,  if  he  will  acknowledge 
anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and 
steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men 
remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfed, put an end 
to their miserable existence. (2007: 140)
In his essay "Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism", Myles Burnyeat questions Hume's 
portrayal of Pyrrhonism, and concludes that the Pyrrhonian skeptic can indeed live 
his skepticism faithfully, because the only thing denied to him is what I have called 
realist belief: 
When the skeptic  doubts that  anything  is  true,  he has  exclusively  in  view 
claims as to real existence. Statements which merely record how things appear 
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are not in question – they are not called true or false – only statements which 
say that things are thus and so in reality. (Burnyeat, 1983: 121)
And  although  the  Pyrrhonian  skeptic  would  not  assent  to  anything  beyond  the 
phenomenally  given,  something  Carneades  arguably  would,  such  a  strictly 
phenomenalist ground is suffcient for the Pyrrhonian to avoid starving to death for 
doubting his hunger, or equivalent scenarios. 
Hume's  vilifcation  of  Pyrrhonism is  polemically  justifed:  he  needs  to  set  up an 
absurdly extreme position as a contrast to the kind of skepticism he aligns himself 
with,  namely  a  Ciceronian  version  of  Academic  skepticism.  But  really,  the  two 
traditions  in  question  were  very  similar.  In  fact,  the  only  line  that  can 
uncontroversially be drawn between the two traditions in general is that while all 
skeptics are "concerned to show that the sceptical life is viable, the Academics never 
promise that it will be tranquil, whereas the Pyrrhonists do" (Thorsrud, 2009: 14).
The claim that skepticism is self-contradictory
The second objection,  that  skepticism is  logically incoherent,  is  more challenging. 
Quotes such as the following one from Cicero's Academica, makes it  look plainly 
indefensible:
I [the character Catulus] return to the position of my father, which he said to 
be that of Carneades; I believe that nothing can be known, but I also believe 
that the wise man will give assent, i.e. will have opinions, but this in such a 
way that he is aware that he is only opining and that he knows that there is  
nothing which can be comprehended and known; hence I approve of this kind 
of withholding assent in all matters, but I vehemently assent to this other view 
that there is nothing which can be known. (Frede, 1987: 212-3)
It is not immediately clear how the skeptic can consistently assent to the claim that 
nothing can be known. If  the claim is  true,  it  cannot  be  known,  and if  it  can be 
known, it cannot be true. Either way, it seems, we have no reason to assent to it. 
Most of the arguments put forth by the ancient skeptics were empirical, inherently 
unable to raise their conclusion to the status of knowledge. The only really strong 
argument they have is the logical argument that correspondence with reality is in 
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principle impossible to verify: If there is such a thing as an external reality beyond 
appearances, gaining knowledge of it can indeed be ruled out. As Xenophanes puts 
it, two hundred years before Pyrrho:
Certain truth [about God or the world] has not and cannot be attained by any 
man; for even if he should fully succeed in saying what is true, he himself 
could not know that it was so. (quoted in Glasersfeld, 2002: 26)
Knowledge is thereby shown to be impossible simply by its defnition in terms of 
correspondence – but  this  defnition involves  an unverifable  assumption,  namely 
that there even is such a thing as an external reality in the frst place. What this means  
is  that  the  claim  that  knowledge  is  impossible  cannot  consistently  be  held  as 
fundamental  in  skepticism.  The fundamental  level  would have to  become one of 
radical agnosticism, where judgment is suspended even with regard to the existence of 
an external world, and hence, the question of the possibility of knowledge becomes 
meaningless. Its denial can only enter the picture together with the postulation of an 
external reality – the claim rests on a fction, and must thus itself be understood in 
epistemologically fctionalist terms,  that is,  as a claim we can entertain, but never 
actually believe is true. Claiming to  know that  nothing can be known is dogmatic 
skepticism. The fctionalist only maintains that this claim is plausible or helpful in 
epistemological analysis, given that its speculative assumptions are correct. In other 
words, the claim is skeptically inspired  speculative metaphysics, not an expression of 
skepticism itself.
The solipsism objection
The third objection, that skepticism leads to solipsism, only works if the solipsism it  
leads  to  is  of  an  ontic kind,  where  assumptions  about  what  may or  may not  lie 
outside  one's  individual  sphere  of  appearances  are  strictly  forbidden.  Most 
intolerable of all, perhaps, is the denial that other persons really exist beyond their  
phenomenal manifestations to the solipsist subject. They are claimed to be no more 
than depthless characters in the solipsist's dream. But such ontological commitments 
are entirely contrary to skepticism! Skepticism cannot lead to ontic solipsism – the 
only kind of solipsism it leads to is of an epistemic kind. This kind of solipsism is no 
more  than  an  acknowledgement  that  nothing  beyond  our  individual  spheres  of 
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experience can truly be known to us, given the correspondence defnition of truth. As 
Erwin  Schrödinger  puts  it:  "every  man's  world  picture  is  and  always  remains  a 
construct of his own mind and cannot be proved to have any other existence" (1958: 
44).  But  unverifability  is  no  obstacle  to  speculation,  and  skepticism  in  no  way 
prohibits  speculative thought,  as  long as the thinker is  careful  not  to mistake  his 
thoughts for reality.  Epistemic solipsism is entirely neutral to the question of how it 
should guide our beliefs and our course of action, and presents no reason to reject  
skepticism.
If the skeptic chooses to entertain the position of ontic solipsism fctionalistically, he is 
of course free to do so. But that would not involve the kind of realist commitment  
required for solipsism to be a reductio ad absurdum argument against skepticism. 
Skepticism taken to its extreme
It  is possible to discount even memory and logic, leaving us without belief in the 
reality of time or of the order inherent in appearances.  This is  arguably the most 
extreme skepticism humanly possible, since brute experiencing seems to be beyond 
our capacity for voluntary suspension. As long as we are alive and conscious, we 
seem to be unable to stop the world of appearances at the door – and the content of 
this world can be abundantly rich, full of apparent order: The world still  appears 
temporal  even if we suspend belief in the reality of time. Space still  seems three-
dimensional, objects present themselves to us as unitary, extended, colored and so on. 
Reality  be  what  it  may,  our  world  of  appearances  is  as  rich  as  it  was  prior  to 
skepticism, missing only our realist interpretation of it and exclusionary immersion 
in it. If the skeptic actively introduces new appearances by refection, or change what 
already appears by the same method, these new appearances simply join with the 
rest, unassented to but nevertheless present. As already discussed, our conception of 
a mind-independent world is this kind of appearance. When the skeptic suspends 
judgment as to whether or not it really exists, it can still be present to him as an idea, 
in such a way that the only thing that  separates  his  idea of  a mind-independent 
world from the realist's idea of the same thing is the attitude the two thinkers have in 
thinking about it.
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One does not have to strip an experience down to its most direct sensory components 
in order to fnd that which one cannot doubt. The full experience, complete with a 
cognitive identifcation of what is sensed, is beyond doubt  as appearance. When the 
skeptic looks at the ocean, he does not see an unidentifed blue patch in his feld of  
vision, he sees what appears to him to be an ocean, and his mind summons all sorts of 
associations to this  experience,  just  as  a realist's  mind would do.  The "privileged 
access" some empiricists claim we have to raw, unrefected sense data in fact extends 
to the full width and depth of experience. There are good reasons to abstract away 
from experience what seems to be interpretative layers to fnd something that can 
plausibly  be  said  to  be  elemental  sensory  information,  for  instance  in  trying  to 
establish reliable invariants in experience that can be used in scientifc reasoning. But 
this has nothing to do with the extent of conscious access to appearances.
A total suspension of belief in the reality of any possible appearance is thus not an 
impoverishment of experience at all – in fact, the effect of skepticism, far from being 
one of restriction, is a mind-boggling liberation of thought:
The  Indians,  in  asserting  the  non-existence  of  every  term  in  possible 
experience, not only free the spirit from idolatry, but free the realm of spirit 
(which is that  of intuition) from limitation;  because if  nothing that appears 
exists, anything may appear without the labour and expense of existing; and 
fancy is invited to range innocently – fancies not murdering other fancies as an 
existence  must  murder  other  existences.  While  life  lasts,  the  feld  is  thus 
cleared  for  innocent  poetry  and  infnite  hypothesis,  without  suffering  the 
judgement to be deceived nor the heart enslaved. (Santayana, 1955: 53)
But  of  course,  this  freedom  is  more  than  a  little  problematic.  The  problem  of 
justifcation is  a  pressing example;  this  is  the frst  topic I  will  discuss in the next 
chapter.
Fictionalist belief
Having  taken  skepticism  to  its  fnal  consequence,  we  have  found  a  new, 
epistemologically  fctionalist  way  to  begin  in  philosophy.  This  chapter  will  be 
devoted to exploring what this attitude involves, how fctionalist belief in general can 
be justifed, and how epistemological fctionalism relates to virtualism. These issues 
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are quite diffcult to convey using words alone, so I have attempted to illustrate them 
with diagrams. 
This  shape  is  meant  to  represent  the  entire 
realm  of  possible  mental  construction,  both 
conceptual  and  perceptual.  Constructions  at 
higher  levels  are  more  speculative,  requiring 
more permissiveness of judgment to accept. At 
lower  levels,  constructions  are  stricter, 
judgment more skeptical.  The strictly negative 
moment of radical skepticism is to be thought of as an extensionless point at the very  
bottom. The circles I have drawn in represent all the different possible views one can 
take, whether scientifc, metaphysical, mystical or naive. All of them can fnd their 
place and scope within this realm. The shapes, sizes and positions of the nameless 
views pictured are  determined merely  for  design  purposes.  A serious  attempt  to 
accurately represent their extensions would render them invisible. Even the totality 
of all views ever held in the history of human culture would only be microscopically  
represented in the diagram. The realm of possible construction is unfathomably vast.
Pictured  here  is  an  epistemological  realist's 
claim of having arrived at truth, where truth is 
defned  as  correspondence  with  reality,  and 
reality  is  understood  as  transcendent  to  the 
realm of mental construction. This radical realist 
claims to know that his view of reality is true in 
virtue of its correspondence with reality itself. 
As discussed, the skeptic argues that any such 
knowledge  claims  are  unjustifed.  If  the 
epistemological  realist  were  to  accept this 
skeptical  argument  but  remain  an 
epistemological  realist,  he  would  fnd  himself  in  nihilism  –  believing  that  it  is  
pointless  to  exercise  our  cognitive  capacity,  or  perhaps  even  that  an  empty 
nothingness is somehow the truth about reality. And given that realism is our default 
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position  by  human  instinct,  it  is  no  wonder 
skepticism has such a bad reputation. But as I 
have argued, even though the skeptic denies the 
possibility  of  true  knowledge  and  therefore 
assumes  that  all  positive  views  are  basically 
untrue  or  fctional,  truth  is  not  a  necessary 
ingredient  in  the  justifcation  of  belief.  It  is 
possible  to  believe  fctionalistically.  But  what 
reasons  can  the  fctionalist  point  to  for  his 
beliefs? What criterion can we employ for the 
adoption or rejection of fctionalist views? What 
criteria should we employ?
The problem of justifcation
The  way  most  philosophers  attempt  to  resolve  the  problem  of  justifcation  is 
exclusionary and usually assumes that empiricist beliefs are the only kind of beliefs 
that can or need be justifed. The problem is framed as being about how the "evidence 
of the senses" can give rise to justifed belief, and thus most solutions proposed only 
justifes the kind of belief involved in empirical science, or empirical thinking on a 
more commonsensical level, to the exclusion of other kinds of belief. This is true even 
for Carneades, whose plausibility criterion is basically one of naive empiricism. One 
particularly interesting different approach is that of George Santayana, partly due to 
the fact that his starting point is very close to that of epistemological fctionalism:
All  essences  [i.e.,  possible  constructions]  and  combinations  of  essences  are 
brother-shapes  in  an  eternal  landscape;  and  the  more  I  range  in  that 
wilderness, the less reason I fnd for stopping at anything, or for following any 
particular path. Willingly or regretfully, if I wish to live, I must rouse myself 
from this open-eyed trance into which utter scepticism has thrown me. I must 
allow subterranean forces within me to burst forth and to shatter that vision. I 
must consent to be an animal or a child, and to chase the fragments as if they 
were things of moment. But which fragment, and rolling in what direction? I 
am resigned to  being a  dogmatist;  but  at  what  point  shall  my dogmatism 
begin, and by what frst solicitation of nature? (1955: 111)
– 17 –
Santayana appeals  to  an instinctive impulse he calls  "animal  faith" to  ground his  
belief  system,  by  postulating  "substance",  which  in  his  terminology  means  "the 
assumption  that  there  are  things  and  events  prior  to  the  discovery  of  them and 
independent  of  this  discovery".  This  postulate,  Santayana  argues,  "underlies  all 
natural  knowledge".  And therefore,  the  Berkeleian  objection  that  these  things  are 
transcendent to human experience "may be dismissed at once as vain and sophistical;  
for it rescinds that animal faith, or that common sense, which is the beginning of art  
and  of  science  and  their  perpetual  presupposition"  (1955:  186).  This  solution, 
although  profound,  is  still  exclusionary,  and  as  Santayana  admits,  it  is  strictly 
speaking irrational and arbitrary:
Belief in substance, taken transcendentally, as a critic of knowledge must take 
it,  is  the most irrational,  animal,  and primitive of beliefs;  it  is  the voice  of 
hunger.  But  when,  as  I  must,  I  have  yielded  to  this  presumption,  and 
proceeded  to  explore  the  world,  I  shall  fnd  in  its  constitution  the  most 
beautiful justifcation for my initial faith, and the proof of its secret rationality. 
This  corroboration  will  not  have  any  logical  force,  since  it  will  be  only 
pragmatic, based on begging the question, and perhaps only a bribe offered by 
fortune to confrm my illusions. The force of the corroboration will be merely 
moral,  showing  me  how  appropriate  and  harmonious  with  the  nature  of 
things such a belief was on my part. (1955: 190-1)
A stricter approach to justifcation than this cannot be exclusionary. It will have to be 
pluralist:  we cannot suppose there to be a single universal  ground for belief or a 
single  privileged criterion.  In  fact,  from the epistemologically  fctionalist  point  of 
view,  we have no reason to exclude  any criteria  from being employed – such  an 
exclusion would demand a higher order criterion, and we have no way of fnding an 
absolute, objective grounding for such a criterion. 
The question of justifcation is, as Santayana suggests, a normative question, and since 
epistemology is incapable of providing us with normative guidelines,  we have to 
start from a position open to making use of  any criteria. This blank justifcationary 
cheque is, however, not an argument that all criteria are equally good, because even to 
assert this radical relativism would be to take a normative position. 
Intuitively, some views result in beliefs that can only be characterized as insane; ones 
that would make our lives unlivable. Others bury our minds in endless detail or silly 
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fantasy, and are clearly hindrances rather than help. But implicit in these intuitively 
obvious rejections of certain beliefs are exactly the kind of normative criteria we have 
no absolute warrant for asserting. It seems that in this question, like in the question of 
the existence of an external reality, the skeptic has to suspend all realist judgment, but 
nevertheless go on to exert fctionalist judgment in some minimal, philosophically 
careful way. We can assume that reality exists, if we are aware that this is merely an 
assumption. Similarly, we can assume at the start of the present investigation into 
justifcation that it is rational to judge views based on their being expedient to simple  
purposes. Relative to any particular purpose, the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different possible criteria for belief can be estimated. For instance, if we set ourselves 
the goal of making theoretical sense of experience, criteria like those found in the 
(still evolving) scientifc method have proven to be incredibly well suited, as can be 
judged  by  the  outstanding  track  record  of  the  predictions  made  by  the  models 
produced  by  empirical  science.  No  known  criteria  can  match  this  remarkable 
expediency  relative  to  this  particular  purpose.  On the  other  hand,  if  our  goal  is 
something else entirely, for instance to encourage the feeling of being at home in the 
world,  or having a meaningful  role in a world narrative,  the scientifc method is 
patently inferior to criteria that would produce views we would call religious.
But  even  given  the  assumption  that  our  views  should  be  expedient  to  simple 
purposes,  the core  of  the  original  diffculties  still  remain:  they have merely  been 
passed on to the question of what purposes we should set ourselves – to determine this 
we still need to appeal to a normative criterion of some sort. Ultimately, we have to 
appeal to individual intuition, but just leaving it at that would be rather unhelpful. 
The best way to proceed seems to me to be anthropological: to infer from the major 
areas  of  human culture  to  the  purposes  that  are  or  have  been  important  in  our 
history. All manners of justifcation are inherently arbitrary; what an analysis of our 
cultural  history can help us  single out are what  problems living and functioning 
human beings have sought solutions to, what purposes human life typically operates 
with  –  either  explicitly  or,  as  is  far  more  often  the  case,  implicitly.  In  lack  of  
normatively neutral theoretical reasons, this anthropological method can at least give 
us  practical reasons to investigate a manageable set of purposes, and to critique the 
examples of belief systems human culture has produced in order to accomplish these 
basic aims. A satisfactory analysis of this kind would have to be very extensive, as 
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well as  very speculative,  and falls well  outside the scope of this essay. But a few 
relatively uncontroversial  examples will  be useful.  I  will  assume that science and 
religion are products  of ineradicably basic  human needs.  Although I  will  have to 
suggest concrete defnitions of what it is they aim to achieve, these should not be 
taken as attempts at legislating for either cultural project. I simply provide my own 
thoughts on what their purposes are, or, in the case of religion, what its purposes 
should be. Even if my defnitions seem to the reader to be wrongheaded, I think my 
analysis  can  have  some  value,  if  only  in  making  the  general  case  for 
compartmentalism. 
As  I  will  show,  virtualism  can  at  least  partly  be  justifed  without  making  any 
assumptions, i.e., purely on the basis of epistemological fctionalism. But before I get 
to that, I will expand on the topic of fctionalist belief, and discuss science, religion, 
and the possibility for their compatibility.
Fictionalist immersion
A fctionalist can with good philosophical conscience believe in a way that is almost 
identical  to  realist  belief.  Constructions  can  be  given  the  stamp  of  theoretical 
approval  as  long  as  the  fctionalist  maintains,  in  the  back  of  his  mind,  the  as-if 
qualifcation  to  his  beliefs.  With  the  same  reservation,  even  the  full  feeling  of 
immersion in fctional worlds can be emulated. But whereas the realist is fooled by 
the  reality  illusion  he  enters  into,  the  fctionalist  maintains  an  awareness  of  the 
questionable  nature  of  what  presents  itself  as  reality,  however  convincing  this 
presentation may be. His immersion is  lucid. Where the realist  actually mistakes his 
construction for reality, the fctionalist makes merely instrumental use of this same 
mental  operation  –  as  a  means  to  ends,  such  as  to  avoid  getting  distracted  by 
epistemological misgivings. A radically skeptical scientist, for instance, can use belief 
and immersion in the theories he is working on as a technique to focus his attention 
and  make  it  easier  to  spot  anomalies  that  challenges  him  to  tweak  the  theories  
further, or to fnd practical applications for them. In general, scientifc progress seems 
to be furthered by chasing the dream of truth, but this both can and should be done  
lucidly, i.e., with awareness that it is in fact a dream. 
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As another important example, a radical skeptic can certainly entertain naive realism 
in his practical life – in fact he would fnd it diffcult to avoid, as the world thus 
conceived is  by  far  the least  laborious  and most  streamlined interface for  simple 
everyday thought and action. Working with the mind's natural inclination rather than 
against  it,  the  fctionalist  uses  realism  as  a  practically  indispensable  tool.  To 
foreshadow later discussions: "The conscious brain is a biological machine – a reality 
engine – that purports to tell us what exists and what doesn't" (Metzinger, 2009: 20).  
A skeptic that tries to do without this basic function will fnd himself incapacitated. 
In  the  words  of  Goethe,  as  paraphrased  by  Nietzsche  in  one  of  his  Untimely 
Meditations:  "whoever  destroys illusions in himself  and others is  punished by the 
sternest tyrant, nature" (2010, section 7). This insight is essential to fctionalism.
The  falseness  of  a  judgment  is  for  us  not  necessarily  an  objection  to  a 
judgment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The question 
is  to  what  extent  it  is  life-promoting,  life-preserving,  species-preserving, 
perhaps even species-cultivating. And we are fundamentally inclined to claim 
that the falsest judgments (which include the synthetic judgments a priori) are 
the  most  indispensable  for  us;  that  without  accepting the  fctions  of  logic, 
without measuring reality [by which he probably means experiential reality 
rather than ontic] against the purely invented world of the unconditional and 
self-identical,  without  a  constant  falsifcation  of  the  world  by  means  of 
numbers, man could not live – that renouncing false judgments would mean 
renouncing life and a denial of life. (Nietzsche, 1989: 11-12)
The fact  that  fctionalism not only allows but encourages  as-if realism, introduces 
terminological diffculties, as the term "realism" has hitherto in the discussion been 
primarily  associated  with  the  opposite  of  fctionalism,  namely  epistemological 
realism.  But  even  this  term  becomes  ambiguous,  as  the  fctionalist  can  emulate 
everything, even its negative image. To make myself clear, I will therefore make use 
of the more unambiguous term anti-fctionalism where needed. But for the most part, 
the discussion from here on will presuppose epistemological fctionalism, and most 
talk of realism will be understood in the fctionalist sense unless explicitly specifed. 
Talk of truth and ontology, on the other hand, is more burdened with anti-fctionalist 
connotations, and will require more carefulness, even though the fctionalist has no 
diffculty appropriating these terms as well. 
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Fictionalist immersion is not entirely unproblematic. Believing and disbelieving at 
the same time creates a tension that can be hard to maintain; one's mental state tends 
to gravitate to either side. The only way to immerse oneself without this internal 
confict is to forget for a moment one's skeptical reservations. As long as they can be 
retrieved  when  needed,  for  instance  when  confronted  with  epistemological 
questions, this temporary forgetting is entirely in keeping with skepticism.
A model  for fctionalist  immersion is  the absorbed state of mind met in aesthetic 
appreciation, in particular in connection with world presenting media, like literary or 
cinematic fction. No sane person would be unable to exit such states of immersion, 
however  realistic,  natural  and  true the  fctional  world  seems  in  this  state. 
Epistemological  fctionalism  simply  applies  this  attitude  universally,  even  to 
immersion in the worlds presented to us in waking sensory experience or scientifc 
refection on empirical data. 
Nietzsche  suggests  that  metaphysics  should  be viewed as  "the  legitimate  play of 
grown-ups" (Vaihinger, 2009: 346, footnote 1) rather than as having anything to do 
with  truth.  This  is  certainly  consonant  with  epistemological  fctionalism,  but  the 
latter  generalizes the point,  claiming that  all our worldmaking projects should be 
viewed in this way, as merely legitimate play with useful fction.
A consequence of this is that the fctionalist is epistemologically pluralist. There is no 
reason we should restrict our attention, belief and immersion to just a single world. 
The logical principle  of contradiction,  far from being fundamental,  is  just another 
fctionalist tool. It is certainly useful  within most world conceptions, but not across 
possible worlds defned in terms of separate purposes. The fctionalist has to be open 
to compartmentalism – if, that is, he fnds use for more than one world conception.
Fictionalist science and religion
It  is  often claimed by critics of epistemological realism (i.e.,  anti-fctionalism) that 
scientists, and in particular physicists, believe themselves on a quest to fnd truth, or 
even believe themselves to be in possession of it to some extent. In other words, they 
are  claimed  to  be  realist.  But  this  is  no  longer  the  case.  Modern  physics  is 
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"epistemologically  'agnostic' "  (Schwegler,  2001:  6).  Scientists  see  themselves  as 
simply tweaking conjectural worlds to match and explain empirical data. In other 
words, "all models are wrong, but some are useful". This is exactly the understanding 
of science epistemological fctionalism would suggest, if perhaps in different terms. 
According  to  fctionalism,  scientifc  beliefs  are  beliefs  in  certain  kinds  of 
arrangements  of  fctional  elements,  ones  that  can  comprehensively  account  for 
available evidence in a systematic and economical way, constituting working models 
of  a  postulated  external  and  mind-independent  reality  that  is  the  cause  of  our 
empirical data. And this metaphysically monist postulation is itself justifed by the 
theoretically economical quality of the models that rely on it as compared to those 
possible  on  the  basis  of  a  metaphysically  dualist  or  pluralist  assumption,  or 
metaphysical solipsism. 
Another assumption it is practically necessary for us to make in the context of science 
is that we can secure objectivity or intersubjectivity. From our skeptical, epistemically 
solipsist  starting  point,  this  possibility  is  impossible  to  verify,  but  we  must 
nevertheless proceed  as if it is possible – that is, make use of the assumption as a 
crucially useful fction for doing science. 
From the virtualist point of view, it is reasonable to believe that we, being essentially 
biological machines, can generate the same computational products as each other, at 
least in principle. In this way,  everything we can experience is objective in the way 
that mathematics is. This is more obviously reasonable to assume with regard to the 
simpler, more clearly defned or intuitively more easily accessible experiences, but no 
sharp distinction can be drawn in the realm of virtuality, so the virtualist has to grant  
the theoretical possibility that other brains can think, imagine, perceive or dream in 
exactly the same way as he does. But the only way we have to tentatively confrm 
objectivity,  at least at this point in our history,  is  by means of communication. In 
practice, this is what sets the limits for what experiences and mental constructions we 
call objective: Only those above some arbitrarily set threshold of communicability. 
Rather  mysteriously,  the  scientifc  approach  to  explanation  works  far  better  than 
what we have epistemological reason to expect. From the strictly skeptical point of 
view,  we  have  no  reason  to  expect  experiential  reality  to  be  as  orderly  as  our 
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incredibly  precise  working  scientifc  hypotheses  have  shown it  to  be.  This  is,  of 
course, a profoundly welcome surprise, as Nietzsche emphatically expresses in  The 
Gay Science:
Our amazement. –  It  is  a  deep and fundamental  stroke of  luck that  science 
discovers things that  stand up under examination and that furnish the basis, 
again  and  again,  for  further  discoveries  –  after  all  it  could  be  otherwise!  
Indeed, we are so convinced of the uncertainty and the fantastical quality of 
our judgments and of the eternal change of human laws and concepts that it 
actually amazes  us  how well the results  of  science stand up!  Formerly,  one 
knew  nothing  of  the  changeableness  of  everything  human;  the  habit  of 
attachment to customary morality (Sitte der Sittlichkeit) sustained the faith that 
the entire inner life of humanity was fastened to iron necessity with eternal 
clamps;  perhaps  people  then  experienced a  similar  voluptuous amazement 
when they told each other stories and fairy tales. The miraculous did a lot of 
good to those who at times grew weary of the rule and of eternity. To lose frm 
ground for once! To foat! To err! To be mad! – that was part of the paradise 
and  debauchery  of  former  ages,  whereas  our  bliss  is  like  that  of  the 
shipwrecked man who has climbed ashore and is standing with both feet on 
the frm old earth – marvelling because it does not bob up and down. (2008: 
59-60)
In  fundamental  philosophy,  one  cannot  begin  by  assuming  the  existence  of  an 
external reality without belying the subject matter. But less strict felds of theoretical 
activity  only  need  to  have  their  imagined  worlds  be  workspaces,  practical  and 
expedient to their purposes. No theoretical endeavor beside philosophy has a strong 
requirement for a deeper understanding of the nature of speculative thought and its 
relation to reality. These other endeavors have historically been able to carry on just 
fne  without  much  epistemological  insight,  or  based  on  unfounded  assumptions 
about their own work, and most of them will be able to carry on without input from 
philosophy.  Their worlds need not be founded on anything remotely close to the 
completely satisfying grounds philosophers aim for (and fail to arrive at). Worlds are 
like canvases that can be used instrumentally without refection on the nature of this 
activity or the material involved. But of course,  epistemological insight is, in most 
cases,  helpful  rather  than  a  hindrance  for  such  activity,  to  avoid  reifcation  or 
superstition and the problems inherent to these fallacious attitudes.
Contrary to Kant's conception of empirical realism, the epistemological  fctionalist 
cannot see any limits to science but, in a sense, the limits of our imagination: As we 
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develop our mathematical imagination to new heights of complexity, physics, being 
applied mathematics, can be expected to be able to describe its empirical data in new, 
better and more economical ways. As to the question of whether or not science can be 
completed: We simply cannot know, even in principle, because, as discussed, even if 
we were to achieve this feat, we would have no way of verifying the completeness or 
truth of our theories.
But the scientifc conception of the world, however useful and impressive, does in the 
end stand on even ground with other areas of culture:  "Sense, history, science, and 
poetry are all in the same case: they arrest essences, exclamatory visions, and apply 
them as  names  to  the  fux of  nature,  which  they  can  neither  fathom nor  arrest" 
(Santayana,  1942:  110).  The  other  major  cultural  product  I  will  consider  here  is 
religion. And it, too, must be framed in fctionalist terms, even though this is contrary 
to the superstitious insistence of most religious people that it is true revelation. As I 
will  defne it  for  the purposes  of  this  discussion,  religion  is  to  be understood as  
merely presenting a view we can immerse ourselves in for emotional or existential 
benefts, like encouragement or a comforting feeling of belonging. Viewed this way, 
science and religion do not confict, because the purposes they are designed for are 
entirely  separate.  If,  however,  a  religious  person  claims  that  his  religion  gives  a 
plausible explanatory model of experiential reality, he puts it in direct competition 
with science, a competition any intellectually honest judge would rule in favor of the 
latter, due to the unaccountably magical nature of religious constructions and its lack 
of logical consistency. But religion does not necessarily involve this claim. Fictionalist 
religion of the kind I have outlined does not, and is therefore fully compatible with 
science, in the compartmentalist sense. 
The worlds produced by fctionalist  religion may have to be empirically down to 
earth (as that is most often what is intuitively appealing), but there is no claim to 
having a better model of experiential reality than science. Religious worlds are purely 
imaginary, bound only by the uses we have for them. The words of F.A. Lange, as 
quoted by Vaihinger in The Philosophy of 'As if' are appropriate:
"we  should  create  for  ourselves  in  imagination  a  fairer  and  more  perfect 
world", and thereby "idealize life". "If this principle is once conceded, we shall 
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be compelled to allow its value to myth – as myth" ("even the unbeliever" can, 
in  this  sense,  "make  the  ideal  image  of  Christ  his  own").  But  it  is  more 
important that we shall rise to the recognition that it is the same necessity, the 
same . . . root of our human nature, which supplies us through the senses with 
the idea of  the world of  reality  and which leads us,  in  the exercise  of  our 
highest creative and synthetic powers, to fashion a world of the ideal, in which 
to take refuge from the limitation of the senses, and in which to fnd again the 
true Home of our Spirit." (2009: 330)
Most of the anti-religious arguments presented throughout the ages, which have been 
perhaps most clearly stated by the "new atheists" movement of the present day, have 
no  application  to  religion  fctionalistically  understood.  As  Santayana  correctly 
observes:
There are two stages in the criticism of myth, or dramatic fancy, or the sort of 
idealism  that  sees  purposes  and  intentions  and  providential  meanings  in 
everything.  The frst  stage  treats  them angrily  as  superstitions;  the  second 
treats them smilingly as poetry. (1955: 247)
Believing  in  the  methods  and  results  of  science  only  excludes  us  from  belief  in 
alternative  views  and  practices  aimed  at  the  same  goal,  and  neither  religion  or 
metaphysics does that – or rather, they don't necessarily do that, and certainly should 
refrain from attempting it, unless of course their products are able to surpass those of 
empirical science in expediency.
With regard to the question of how to choose what compartment to enter into when – 
that is, what aims we should pursue – I cannot see any way to avoid the appeal to  
individual intuition. There is no third person vantage point from which we can make 
the judgment, except of course of the fctionalist sort, which by defnition itself is a 
compartment or arbitrary frame we would have to enter into, on the basis of our 
individual inclination. In other words, we cannot avoid the burden of a fundamental 
personal responsibility for our lives and the worlds we choose to live in.
Metaphysics and the justifcation for virtualism
Metaphysics,  as  I  understand  and  use  this  ambiguous  term,  is  speculative 
constructions  beyond  the  reach  of  empirical  science  that  aims  to  describe  the 
fundamental  structures  of  reality  or  our  cognitive  access  to  it.  The  number  of 
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different  possible  metaphysics  is  immeasurably  large,  and  each  particular  one  is 
diffcult to precisely distinguish from each other, due to overlapping claims. What I 
have called  ontic  solipsism can somewhat  unproblematically  be  separated as  one 
example, scientifc realism as another – virtualism is the one I will defend. 
Metaphysical theories are not mutually exclusive, unless their aims are precisely the 
same and they differ greatly in their success. The fctionalist can adhere to several 
different  metaphysical  theories,  simultaneously  or  alternatingly,  if  he  fnds  them 
convincing. For instance, he can simultaneously be committed to both the core claim 
of virtualism and a broader scientifc realism, and then alternate into a completely 
different view, for instance a religious view based on ontic solipsism. The arguments 
for each metaphysical theory are made separately.  So what are the arguments for 
virtualism? When and why should we use it?
Virtualism  can  serve  more  than  one  purpose,  and  every  purpose  to  which  it  is 
expedient is a valid point in justifying belief in it. One of its most important functions 
is  this:  as  an  attempt  to  integrate  what  emerges  from  epistemology  as  the 
fundamental  limitations  of  cognition (i.e.,  skepticism,  fctionalism) with what  has 
emerged from physical science as the fundamental structure of reality (matter and 
forces).  The epistemological  fctionalist  cannot  say anything about  reality,  and the 
physicist cannot (at least not yet) say anything sensible about the nature of the mind 
and its presumably physical production.  Virtualism makes an adaptation of these 
two views to each other possible, resulting in a dualist worldview where real, mind-
independent substances (bodies, brains) are postulated that are able to somehow use 
the laws of nature to compute and render experience and consciousness, as purely 
virtual products the content of which has no direct connection with reality. As I will 
explain in part two, virtualism can be used to support other ontological views than 
this  one,  but  the  dualist  compromise  between  hard  empirical  science  and  strict 
epistemology is its most independent contribution. 
Any  ontological  theory  is  inherently  speculative,  i.e.,  just  another  compartment 
among compartments. The most virtualism can possibly aspire to with the dualist 
ontology introduced above is for it to be suitable fundamental working hypothesis 
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for certain purposes, like for instance those of philosophers, consciousness scientists 
and most social sciences. 
The  full  range  of  thinkers  and  actors  in  the  world  has  use  for  epistemological 
carefulness, so as not to fall prey to superstition. For them, virtualism can serve as a  
helpful  introduction  to  epistemological  fctionalism.  For  others,  such  as 
psychologists, it is more directly useful, as a basic model of how the mind works,  
onto  which they can add layers  of  further  assumptions,  e.g.  about  which mental  
practices are good for us and which are harmful. Consciousness scientists generally 
have extensive use for it,  in much the same way as psychologists, but with much 
greater  promise  of  scientifc  progress,  as  will  be  discussed  in  more  depth  in  the 
second part of this essay.
If  the  brain  is  a  virtual  reality  engine,  and 
experience is what is being rendered by it, then 
we  have  no  direct  contact  with  reality,  and 
cannot know that anything is true. We have to 
understand  all  we  experience,  think  and 
imagine  as  being  untrue,  or  fctional.  In  this 
way  virtualism  leads  back  to  epistemological 
fctionalism. This seems self-undermining, since 
according  to  epistemological  fctionalism, 
virtualism is just another fctional construction 
among infnitely  many other  possible  ones.  If 
true,  virtualism  must  be  a  fction!  This  self-
contradiction is the most challenging objection 
that can be raised against it. But virtualism does 
not have to be true in order to be justifed, as no  fctionalistically understood view 
does.  Far  from being  a  faw,  the  fact  that  virtualism leads  to  or  involves  global 
epistemological fctionalism and skepticism can be used as an argument in favor of it. 
In the completely open feld of non-committing epistemological fctionalism, a view 
that reiterates and thus confrms this basis is more attractive than one that closes 
itself off as true. 
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Virtualism is incoherent on anti-fctionalist (i.e., epistemologically realist) terms, but 
for the fctionalist, it is no more incoherent than any other view. Nothing can be seen 
as more than useful fctions, and virtualism, in contrast to the vast majority of other 
propositions  we  have  for  our  consideration,  acknowledges this  fact.  The  fact  that 
virtualism precludes the possibility of  its  own verifcation is  simply confrming a 
matter of fact the fctionalist is already aware of. 
The  virtualist  and  the  epistemological  fctionalist  both  concur  with  Santayana  in 
saying:
the scepticism I am defending is not meant to be merely provisional; its just 
conclusions  will  remain  fxed,  to  remind  me  perpetually  that  all  alleged 
knowledge of matters of fact is faith only, and that an existing world, whatever 
form it may choose to wear, is intrinsically a questionable and arbitrary thing. 
(1955: 49)
But of course, the fact that virtualism reiterates fctionalism and skepticism is not 
enough to justify belief in it. What makes virtualism particularly attractive is that it 
provides a scientifcally plausible explanation for why our cognitive limitations are 
so  severe;  why  we  fnd  ourselves  unable  to  breach  the  confnes  of  epistemic 
solipsism. And it enables us to expand on epistemological and related issues with a 
much richer and more accessible terminology, based on the analogy between mind 
and the computer generated virtuality with which most of us are familiar. 
As already mentioned, virtualism presupposes some basic form of scientifc realism. 
The broad lines of the story science tells us about ourselves are assumed to be true (in 
the fctionalistic sense, of course): The virtualist assumes we are evolved creatures in 
a tiny corner of an incredibly vast physical universe. This does not preclude us from 
entering  into  alternative  beliefs,  even  ones  that  directly  confict  with  scientifc 
realism, perhaps by postulating some active deity with which we can have a personal 
relationship. As long as any such belief is securely framed in fctionalist terms, there 
is no reason why we should forbid ourselves entering into it, even if that means our  
virtualism is temporarily suspended. Virtualism is not foundational and universal in 
this sense; it can be suspended and taken up again as we please. Epistemological  
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fctionalism, on the other hand, should always be present, even if only in the back of 
one's mind. 
Virtualism  aims  to  provide  a  "grand  unifed  perspective",  a  framework  for 
understanding strict philosophy, the hard empirical science of the present day, and 
everything in between. Furthermore, as a speculative elaboration on epistemological 
fctionalism, it aims to inform us about every mental and cultural activity, what their 
grounds are, how far each of them can hope to reach, what claims they can assert and 
how  strongly,  etc.  In  short,  it  is  a  general  theoretical  framework  (but  still  not 
fundamental in the sense epistemological fctionalism is). The relation of virtualism 
to science is such that if the latter undergoes a revolution and starts seeing things a 
completely  different  way,  virtualism  might  very  well  become  obsolete.  Another 
theory would then have to be proposed to provide a better, more adapted connection. 
But at least for now, I think virtualism is eminently plausible.
Just like virtualism can help to explain and elaborate on epistemological fctionalism, 
the science of consciousness can help to explain and elaborate virtualism. And just 
like virtualism rests on epistemological fctionalism as its foundation, the science of 
consciousness rests on virtualism – or rather, it  should, as forcefully argued by Antti 
Revonsuo in  Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon (2006) –  though 
what I call virtualism is framed by him in entirely different terms. 
Arguments  for believing in virtualism, being half-empirical  metaphysics,  must be 
drawn from both below and above, and since the foundational reasons are, as I have 
described,  very thin,  the  arguments  from above  are  all  the  more  important.  It  is 
however not within my purview to explore the scientifc side of the justifcation of 
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virtualism. Revonsuo (2006) and Metzinger (2009) both provide extensive arguments 
of this kind, some of which I will touch upon in the next part of this essay.
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Part II: Virtualism
In the previous part, my aim was to provide virtualism with the philosophical side of  
its justifcation, and above all to show that it is not an incoherent position. This led  
me to propose a way to found thought in general in radical skepticism, namely by a 
fctionalist turn in epistemology. As I tried to demonstrate, this provides us with the 
strictest possible starting point, and, at the same time, the greatest possible freedom for 
thought. It does not enable us to provide virtualism with a philosophical justifcation 
that is suffcient on its own, but it does allow us to escape the objection that it is self-
undermining.  Its  justifcation  beyond  strictly  logical  coherence  is  a  matter  for 
empirical science, which falls outside the scope of this essay.
In this part, I will explain in detail what virtualism means and explore some of its  
wide-ranging  philosophical  consequences.  I  will  touch  on  a  few  examples  of 
empirical evidence in favor of the theory, but my focus is for the most part purely 
philosophical. The scientifc side of its justifcation is simply assumed for the sake of 
argument.
Before I start, a few remarks on the choice of the term "virtualism" and its relation to 
realism. First, as I have mentioned, the theory rests on at least a minimal scientifc 
realism. Second, it involves ontological realism about virtuality, in the sense that it 
claims assertions  about  virtuality,  without  reference to an external  reality,  has  an 
objective,  determinate truth-value (more on this  later  on).  According to Chalmers 
(2009: 16), such a claim is suffcient to classify the theory as realism. We have several 
reasons, then, to associate virtualism with realism. Instead of "virtualism", it could 
perhaps be called "virtual realism" or "realism of virtuality", just as Plato's idealism 
can  instead  be  called  "Platonic  realism".  Or,  as  Revonsuo  suggests,  it  could  be 
identifed with "representational realism" (2006: 121). But essential to virtualism is the 
distinction  between virtuality  and  reality,  where  our  direct  access  to  the  latter  is 
denied.  Mixing  in  the  term realism in  its  name would  either  invite  unnecessary 
confusion or necessitate a few different terminological choices. I prefer to avoid using 
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the term realism, but this is no more than an arbitrary question of terminology. The 
same issues can be explored in very different terms.
Dreaming machines telepresent in the real world
As stated several times, the basic claim of virtualism is that the world of experience is 
a  virtual  reality  generated  somehow  by  the  brain.  But  why  should  we  call  this 
experiential reality a virtual one? In Inner Presence, Antti Revonsuo makes the case by 
way  of  investigating  the  dreaming  brain  as  a  model  system  for  understanding 
consciousness. His direct answer to the question:
As far as we know anything at all about dreaming and its neuropysiological 
basis, we know that all the biological processes that somehow generate the 
dream experience are occurring inside the brain. Hence, the dream world can 
be regarded as "virtual" for the following reasons. The dream world, though 
compelling, does not exist anywhere in the reality outside of the brain. During 
dreaming, the dreamer is immersed in a seemingly real perceptual world; she 
has  the  fully  convincing  experience  of  being  physically  present  in  it. 
Nevertheless, her physical body is actually present in a quite different physical 
environment. The dream world is thus "virtual" for precisely the same reason 
as  a  computer-generated  synthetic  environment  is:  in  both  cases  I  feel  
physically present (i.e., I  am phenomenologically present!) in an unreal place 
where my physical body is not really present at all. (2006: 114)
One could argue that the dreaming brain is unft as a model system for the study of 
consciousness  in  general,  as  real consciousness  requires  something  not  present  in 
dreaming, like empirical content that for some reason can only be acquired by the 
senses, or a level of awareness only reached when awake. But Revonsuo dismisses 
both  of  these  objections.  The  frst  because,  as  he  shows,  we  have  "considerable 
empirical support" for the statement that the full range of qualitative phenomenal 
content can be generated by the dreaming brain (2006: 82), even if not with as much 
regularity  as  in  waking  consciousness.  And the  second objection  is  dismissed  by 
reference  to  the  possibility  of  reaching  a  waking  level  of  awareness  while  still  
dreaming  –  the  phenomenon  called  lucid  dreaming.  The  latter  is  particularly 
interesting, as rather than diminishing the sense of realism of the dream, it makes the 
phenomenal illusion even  more convincing: "Though the dreamer knows for a fact 
that  it  is  only  a  dream,  she  may fnd it  ever  harder  to  believe  that  the  spatially 
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extended world all around her is actually somewhere in her own mind (or brain)" 
(2006: 83).
About 1 to 10% of dreams are lucid. In all the rest, "the dream world is taken for real  
by the dreamer", only later to be labeled as unreal – that is, upon awakening (2006: 
83). In this retrospective view of the dream, its content is usually labeled as mere 
representations of things we believe ourselves to  actually experience in waking life. 
But this is a false distinction. What our waking experience presents us with is no less 
unreal  and  representational  than  dreamt  phenomenal  content.  In  fact,  the  naive 
realist's assumption that waking experience is real is just a variation of the dreamer's 
naive assumption that his dream world is real:
The fact is that in both cases we have similar representations of a "world" or a 
"reality," but in everyday waking perception we take the representation for the 
real thing. We have the naive realist stance in everyday waking perception, for 
we regard the mere representation of reality as the external physical reality 
itself. Thus, when there is a similar representation created in the brain during 
dreaming, we cannot help but call it a "reality" as well, although we do realize  
(retrospectively,  though)  that  the  phenomenal  reality  in  that  case  does  not 
represent any external state of affairs. (Revonsuo, 2006: 105)
Revonsuo later gives the following bold summary:
All the phenomenal worlds we enjoy – whether those of dreams, computer-
generated models, or waking "reality" – are basically the same; the realities we 
experience are always "simulated" or "virtual," as is our experienced sense of 
presence within them (2006: 116)
Waking experience is, in a very literal sense, a dreaming state of mind, distinguished 
only by the fact that it is modulated by input from our senses, as explicitly suggested 
by the neuroscientist  Rodolfo Llinás  (2002: 2),  who also takes this to its  dramatic 
conclusion, by pronouncing us "dreaming machines by nature!" (2002: 259).
But of course, the fact that our capacity for virtual reality generation is modulated by 
sense  data  in  waking  experience  is  a  very  signifcant  difference.  The  point  of 
juxtaposing dreaming and waking is only ontological: The phenomenal material of 
both kinds of experience is the same, the difference is only the ways in which it is 
being used. "When dreaming, as we are released from the tyranny of our sensory 
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input,  the  system generates  intrinsic  storms that  create  'possible'  worlds"  (Llinás, 
2002: 2). In contrast, our waking state seems to be causally determined by sense data 
to a great extent. Revonsuo frames this state of mind in terms of "telepresence" – that 
is, technology allowing one to feel as if present somewhere else than where one really 
is, for instance by means of audio-visual and perhaps even tactile feedback systems.  
Revonsuo's claim is that this is a perfect analogy for the relation between experiential 
reality  and  the  true  reality  external  and  transcendent  to  it.  This  counterintuitive 
perspective is presented through a clever thought experiment. Revonsuo asks us to 
imagine  being  an  astronaut  exploring  a  strange  world  with  no  visible  light,  no 
audible sound, nothing at all that our senses can work with. 
You feel like foating in a sensory-deprivation tank, unable even to perceive 
the position of your body, let alone the environment you are surrounded by. 
Somehow you manage to return to the mother ship. You examine carefully all 
the  data  that  were  collected  from  the  planet's  surface.  You  fnd  out  that 
actually there is a lot of physical activity going on but of a kind you have 
never  encountered  before.  Consequently,  you  were  not  able  to  perceive 
anything. Well, you do not give up – you design a suit that has sensors for the 
alien radiations and vibrations on the planet, translating them into the sort of 
physical stimuli that your body is able to handle. Thus, a certain sort of alien 
radiation is translated, by your goggles, into electromagnetic radiation of the 
visible  wavelengths;  the  vibrations  of  the  planet's  strange  atmosphere  are 
translated into vibrations of air near your ears, and so on. When you return to 
the  planet,  you  step  into  a  quite  different,  spatial  and  extended world  of 
objects,  colors,  and sounds.  Now your  brain  can  construct  an  experienced 
model of the world, which enables you to successfully interact with the world. 
Of course, the world in itself is still silent and dark, just physical matter and 
energy hurrying  about,  but  nevertheless,  your  brain  is  now clothing it  (its 
model,  that  is)  with  properties  that  do  not  really  exist  out  there.  The 
phenomenal level of organization is, thus, an illusion created by the brain, but 
still, a most useful one for an organism that must fnd its way around. (2006: 
117)
As he  goes on to explain,  this  strange planet  is  the Earth,  the space suit  is  your 
sensory systems,
the  "translations"  of  alien  physical  signals  into  familiar  ones  is  the 
transmutation from external physical stimuli frst into internal neural frings 
and then into internal phenomenal features at the phenomenal level; and the 
useful out-of-brain illusion somehow created inside the brain is the thing we 
ordinarily call "reality"; the simulation of the world with the self as the central 
actor. "Reality" is only the fully immersive "world simulation" that creates the 
telepresence experience constrained by current sensory input. (117)
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This  analogy  is  superbly  apt,  except,  as  Llinás  would  object:  "Because  the  brain 
operates  for  the  most  part  as  a  closed  system,  it  must  be  regarded  as  a  reality 
emulator  rather  than a  simple translator"  (2002:  13).  The capacity of  our brain to 
generate consciously experienced virtual reality is being used to simulate an external 
reality – or rather, to assemble from what is essentially fctional dream material a 
model that works as well as possible. When we see trees, houses and people in our 
waking state of mind, what we see are completely virtual objects, dream things that 
happen to be rendered by our brain in just the right place and just the right way for 
our real bodies to be able to navigate our real environment with minimal diffculty 
and effort.  Under  normal  circumstances  there  is  no  sign  at  all  of  glitches in  this 
rendering that would make us suspect that our experiential world is not the external 
reality itself. The reality rendering of our brains is usually completely invisible to our 
minds. The astonishingly high level of evolutionary optimization of our brains have 
made it extremely diffcult for us to lift the veil of illusion. 
The global model of reality constructed by our brain is updated at such great 
speed and with such reliability that  we generally do not experience it  as a 
model. For us, phenomenal reality is not a simulational space constructed by 
our brains;  in a direct  and experientially untranscendable manner,  it  is  the 
world we live in. (Metzinger, 2009: 107)
On the evolutionary explanation
Berkeley was right that sensations are ideas,  but his  explanation of their  superior 
clarity and realism to that of imagined ideas, namely that sensation is partaking in 
the  ideas  of  God,  is  obviously  not  a  viable  one.  So  how  can  it  be  explained? 
Philosophers  should  not  be  ashamed  to  pass  questions  like  this  one  on  to  the 
empirical  sciences,  even  if  this  means  we  are  left  with  the  philosophically 
unsatisfying answer "because we're wired that way". Further inquiries into why and 
how exactly are the topics of evolutionary biology and neuroscience respectively, and 
the only tasks for philosophy here are prior to and after the work of science is done – 
i.e., critique of its underlying assumptions and speculative elaboration on the basis of  
scientifc results and theories.
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The  practically  universally  held  theoretical  framework  scientists  employ  in 
explaining how we have become the beings we fnd ourselves to be, and thus also the 
reason why we are wired the way we are, is the theory of evolution. The fact that 
waking experience is so perfectly realistic that our natural condition is one of utter 
ignorance of its virtual nature is explained simply by reference to the evolutionary 
mechanism. The same goes for our equally transparent self-model, by which is meant 
the feeling of being a self and possessing a body (a topic that will be explored in 
greater detail in a later chapter):
The self-model activated in the human brain has been optimized over millions 
of years. The process that constructs it is fast, reliable, and has a much higher 
resolution that any of today's virtual-reality games. As a result, the virtuality 
of  the  phenomenal  self-model  tends  to  be  invisible  to  its  user.  But  strictly 
speaking, it is simply the best hypothesis the system has about its own current 
state (Metzinger, 2009: 108)
Berkeley thought of empirical phenomena as signs delivered to us by God rather 
than as effects produced by things themselves. And again, he is partly right, except 
we have no scientifc reason to believe that it is God who delivers the signs to us – 
science casts our brains for this role. The "wisdom" inherent in the signs delivered to 
us  in  experience  is  merely  one of  evolutionary  adaptation –  in  a  sense,  it  is  our 
wisdom, although beyond our conscious control, and even, at least so far, beyond our 
analytical grasp.
A crucial  point  in  this  context  is  the  fact  that  evolutionary  pressure  not  only 
optimizes for precision,  but also for comfort.  In other  words,  part  of the wisdom 
inherent in the way the world appears to us is that it falsifes the world for us, to make 
it palatable, endurable – in a word, to make it human. Our brain has to make the 
world  we live  in  seem like  a  good,  homelike  place  to  be,  because  if  it  had not,  
humankind would long since have given up on life. This gives inquiring minds good 
reason to be suspicious of the world as presented, to not take appearances on their 
word – but on the other hand, and I think this is critical in the long run: we have to  
recognize and appreciate the vital importance of this benign falsifcation of the world. 
Philosophers and scientists should continue to do their best to look behind the veils, 
but  it  is  just  as  important  that  we  investigate  how they  work,  how they  can  be 
manipulated, how they can be tweaked and updated to a high level of expediency 
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even in our alienating present and future circumstances, so far removed from those of 
our  ancestors  for  which  our  experiential  capacity  was  originally  optimized. 
Philosophy must not only be an unveiler, but also a conservator and purveyor of 
veils – of vital falsehoods. In other words, it is critical that we take up the religious  
project despite having gained awareness of its nature as fction and mind trickery. 
This  important  topic  will  be  discussed  further  in  the  essay's  fnal  and  most 
speculative chapter. 
The hard problem
The naturalist approach to reality has, due to its objectifcation of experiential reality, 
a blind spot when it comes to the problem of consciousness, as Erwin Schrödinger 
keenly observes in his book Mind and Matter:
The  reason why our  sentient,  percipient  and thinking  ego is  met  nowhere 
within our  scientifc  world  picture can easily  be indicated in  seven words: 
because  it  is  itself  that  world  picture.  It  is  identical  with  the  whole  and 
therefore cannot be contained in it as part of it. (1958: 52)
Both the fundamental philosophical attitude presented in part one and the virtualist 
perspective here under consideration can inform us as to how to deal with the hard 
problem of consciousness. They cannot provide a solution, but present a reason to 
reframe it as a strictly empirical question. As I have argued, philosophy should not 
presuppose an external reality to which it gives theoretical primacy. Instead, it should 
be frmly rooted in the fctional or virtual realm of the conscious subject. The hard 
problem from the philosophical point of view is not how consciousness can emerge 
from physical reality, but the epistemological question of how the existence of this 
reality can be determined. The hard problem of consciousness is thus left entirely to 
empirical science. 
Of course, the metaphysical position of virtualism can, and I believe should, inform 
science in the quest for a satisfactory solution to this problem, but it only fgures in 
this project as a set of guiding fundamental assumptions – assumptions that does 
however present us with reasons to be optimistic: Not only does the project seem 
solvable in principle, as is already suggested by the reductionist ontological monism 
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hard empirical science is generally committed to; it seems realistic to assume, or at  
least hope that it is solvable in practice. Because if the mind is essentially a capacity 
for  virtual reality generation,  it  should be quantifable,  and the rapid progress  of 
virtual  reality  technology  (by  electronic  means  or  otherwise)  should  give  us  the 
perfect  tool  to  perform  experiments  on  our  own  minds,  and  eventually  even 
artifcially  reproduce mind  and  consciousness  in  a  highly  manipulable  way  with 
complete data access to all computational operations involved. If the mind is indeed 
a computational product, it should be possible to completely decode the activity of 
the brain, thereby enabling us not only to understand it, but even to directly and with 
complete control manipulate, enhance and augment it. These visions, which from a 
purely scientifc point of view are strongly optimistic, can obviously not be realized 
any  time  soon,  and  there  might  very  well  turn  out  to  be  impassable  technical 
obstacles on the way to get there, but we do at least have theoretical reason to hope 
that they can be realized.
Though  of  course,  even  if  we  do  arrive  at  a  perfectly  working  model  of  the 
mechanism of mind and how consciousness can emerge from physical events, this 
would by no means be a philosophically satisfying solution to the problem. Just as with 
the astonishingly precise models physicists have been able to produce: we can always 
ask  impossible  questions  like  why the  wave  functions  described  by  quantum 
mechanics collapse with observation,  why the forces of fundamental interaction are 
fxed to certain strengths, why the universe came into existence at the moment of the 
Big Bang, and so on. And even though all the questions I listed can be and has been 
addressed by theoretical physicists, they can only explain them in terms of further 
descriptive  hypotheses,  such  as  the  multiverse  hypothesis  or  the  many-worlds 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. The same will necessarily be the case also for 
any scientifc solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Philosophers thus return 
to the hard problem of epistemology. And as I have indicated from the beginning of 
this essay, this problem is in principle unsolvable due to the nature of mind and its 
relation to mind-independent reality. 
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The virtual self
Conscious experience [...] is an interface, an invisible, perfect internal medium 
allowing an organism to interact fexibly with itself. It is a control device. It 
functions by creating an internal user interface – an "as if" (that is, virtual) 
reality.  It  flters  information,  has  a  high  bandwidth,  is  unambiguous  and 
reliable, and generates a sense of presence. More importantly, it also generates 
a sense of self. (Metzinger, 2009: 105)
The self is "just a particular mental state, a generated abstract entity we refer to as 'I'  
or  'self'"  (Llinás,  2002:  127).  Whereas  the  appearance  of  an external  world  is  our 
informational interface to reality, the bodies we perceive ourselves to possess, as well 
as our self-conception, are our control interface.
The  brain's  job  is  to  simulate  the  body  for the  body  and  to  predict  the 
consequences of the body's movements, and the instruments it uses is the self-
model. This process takes place in the real world, so it is time-consuming and 
necessarily  generates  a  lag  between  the  actual  state  and  the  self-model's 
content.
Normally  we're  unaware  of  this  process,  because  nature  engineered  it  so 
effciently that errors rarely occur. But the simple fact remains: You are never 
in  direct  contact  with  your  own  body.  What  you  feel  in  the  rubber-hand 
illusion  [...]  is  exactly  the  same as  what  you  feel  when  you attend  to  the 
sensation  of  your  hands  holding  this  book right  now,  or  to  the  feeling  of 
pressure  and  resistance  when  you  lean  back  in  your  chair.  What  you 
experience is not reality but virtual reality, a possibility. Strictly speaking, and 
on the level of conscious experience alone, you live your life in a virtual body 
and not in a real one. (Metzinger, 2009: 114)
The rubber hand illusion Metzinger refers to is experienced by test subjects when 
they see a rubber hand on a table in front of them being stroked by a brush while 
their real hand, hidden behind a screen on the table, is synchronously being stroked 
in exactly the same way. This makes tactile and visual feedback confict, and in most 
test subjects the latter overrides the former after a short period of time, giving rise to 
the experience that the location of their hand switches from where their real hand 
actually is to where the rubber hand is placed. The rubber hand is phenomenally 
possessed as one's  own (Botvinick and Cohen,  1998).  This  very local  out-of-body 
experience shows that one's concrete and material sense of self can be detached and 
transferred  from our  actual  body to  an  artifcial  other.  A recent  experiment  with 
immersive  VR technology  confrms  this  conclusion  and takes  it  a  lot  further,  by 
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successfully transferring the sense of whole body ownership of men in their mid-20s 
to  a  completely  virtual  representation  of  a  ten  year  old  girl  (Slater,  Spanlang, 
Sanchez-Vives and Blanke, 2010). In my opinion, experiments like these are the most 
compelling empirical evidence yet in support of the virtualist hypothesis. 
The homunculus objection
Superfcially, looking inside our virtual representations of ourselves or others for a 
causal explanation of perception is missing the point. But there is a deeper point to be 
found here: we really have nowhere else to look than in our virtual representations. 
When we scan or dissect brains in our scientifc search for an understanding of mind 
or perception, what we fnd can never truly be mind-independent and external, as 
discussed. We can only fnd new layers of simulated reality. So in a sense, we do have 
homunculi – that is, beings ascribed causal relevance in our perception. But these are 
only scientifcally postulated beings, useful models in our effort to create economical 
and explanatory models of experiential reality. Our virtual selves are not homunculi  
in the philosophical sense. There is no danger of falling into eternal regress of ever 
littler men inside our self-representations, because we were never externally related 
to the objects of perception in the frst place: "Individual virtual objects are parts of our 
being; we are  not  externally  related to  virtual  objects,  but,  rather,  our  subjectivity  is  
constituted by them" (Revonsuo, 2006: 129).
Our homunculi and the world we in scientifc speculation suppose them to perceive 
are, in the stricter, philosophical perspective, in one and the same ontological realm – 
the virtual. The standard homunculus objection rests on a confusion of the scientifc 
and philosophical  points  of  view, a  confusion of  speculative  postulation with the 
epistemologically fundamental.
The virtual self is the transparent surrogate of the biological organism itself (usually 
located in the center of the world simulation at the phenomenal level). The 
virtual  self  is  nothing  more  than  another  complex  bundle  of  phenomenal 
features,  in  particular,  ones  that  form  the  body  image  in  the  center  of 
phenomenal space. This bundle is not special in any fundamental way: it does 
not carry out acts of awareness toward mental (of physical) objects, its relation 
to the other virtual objects that are present is not constitutive of those objects 
being phenomenally experienced. The virtual self is simply one organized bundle  
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of phenomenality among others, and were it to disappear (as sometimes happens 
in dreams and out-of-body experiences) the rest of the virtual world would 
continue to be present for the subject (i.e. it would continue to constitute the 
subjective  virtual  world)  as  if  nothing  special  would  have  happened. 
(Revonsuo, 2006: 132)
The transcendental subject
A self-presenting state need not be presented to any subject or homunculus; 
therefore,  we should get  rid of  the existence of  the mysterious  "subject"  of 
experience altogether. Experience is  subjective, but it is not presented to some 
intangible entity, the mythical subject, that would be external to the experience 
itself but somehow internal to the mind or brain of the individual. (Revonsuo, 
2006: 131)
Resorting to this kind of adjectival defnition of experience for fear that a noun would 
indicate excessive  ontological  commitment  is  only  one terminological  strategy for 
philosophical clarity. Another, and to my mind, more useful one is Kant's concept of a 
transcendental  subject:  The  nondescript  perceiver  of  perception  and  thinker  of 
thoughts. Von Glasersfeld introduces this concept indirectly by quoting Wittgenstein:
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the 'world is my world'. . . The 
philosophical I  is  not the man, not the human body or  the human soul of 
which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not a part of 
the world. (2002: 122, quote is from Tractatus paragraph 5.641)
From which he continues:
In  the  constructivist  view,  the  self  we  conceive,  as  well  as  its  body,  are 
necessarily the product of that active agent that Wittgenstein called the 'I' that 
is not part of the world. Whatever the other-worldly part of the self builds up 
is  gauged  according  to  its  viability  in  experience.  Thus  there  is  a  rather 
straightforward way to approach the component of the self-concept that is part 
of the experiential world. Instead of asking what the self is in the philosopher's 
sense,  one  can ask how we experience  our self.  This  does  not  concern the 
mysterious  entity  that  does  the  experiencing,  but  focuses  on  the  tangible 
structure,  the body that is  experienced as one's own. Such an investigation 
takes the mysterious self-conscious entity for granted and proceeds to examine 
how  that  entity  comes  to  recognize  itself  both  as  agent  and  as  percept 
distinguished from the rest of its experiential feld. (2002: 123)
This is not only in keeping with virtualism, but must be supposed even from the 
strictly skeptical point of view argued in part one to be philosophically fundamental.
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Ontology and the concept of truth
Virtualism can be made to support three different kinds of ontological commitments. 
For  the purposes  of  hard empirical  science,  virtualism can assent  to  its  generally 
assumed commitment to physicalist monism, according to which the nature of the 
mind must  be studied as a computational  product of  the brain,  i.e.,  an emergent 
property of purely physical events, to which it can in principle be reduced to. For the 
purposes of pure philosophy (as I  defne this  fexible term),  virtualism assents to 
epistemically  solipsist  monism,  according  to  which  whatever  reality  appears  to 
manifest itself as is entirely arbitrary. This conclusion is supported by the basic tenet 
of virtualism that we only have direct  epistemic access to the virtual realm, from 
which it follows that any postulation of an external, mind-independent reality must 
be  viewed  as  just  that,  a  postulation.  The  third  ontological  position  or  range  of 
positions, which I call as-if dualism, emerges from a compromise of the two extremes: 
At least a minimal scientifc realism is supposed, but the domain of reality is strictly 
separated from the domain of virtuality.
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No anti-fctionalist could consistently be committed to more than one ontology. But 
as explained in part one, virtualism is necessarily epistemologically fctionalist. Its 
ontological  commitments  are  never  fnal,  never  supposed  to  be  true  in  the 
epistemological realist sense. The different ontologies would still confict if asserted 
in the same context, but their contexts are completely separate. Compartmentalism of 
ontology is unproblematic given epistemological fctionalism.
In  the  context  of  either  of  the  two monisms,  the  role  of  virtualism is  limited to  
providing supportive assumptions. As-if dualism, however, is an independent and 
original proposal. It constitutes a range of attempts to reach a compromise between 
the two sides,  based on virtualism.  This  is  the principal concern of the following 
discussion.
The spectrum of as-if dualism
The  question  of  whether  we  can  bridge  the  gap  between  empirical  science  and 
philosophy is a variation of the question of whether we can bridge the gap between 
mind-independent reality and the mental realm – that is, to solve either of the two 
hard problems I distinguished earlier. As-if dualism is not proposed as a solution to 
these problems, it is merely a speculative construct half-way from either side. It aims 
at presenting worldviews expedient to everything in between pure philosophy and 
hard empirical science. 
On the one hand, we have a virtual reality we in our scientifc effort have shaped to  
be a plausible model of a reality external to the virtual realm of the mind. On the 
other  hand, we have the external reality itself.  Admittedly, the latter is  ultimately 
unknowable, but in as-if dualism we nevertheless suppose it to exist and that it has 
certain  content  –  minimally,  bodies  that  contain  computational  structures  able  to 
generate the forms of virtuality we experience as our phenomenal worlds as well as 
the conscious experience of being the experiencer of this content. Furthermore, our 
brains  are  assumed  to  be  well  designed:  although  our  minds  are  denied  the 
possibility  of  having  true  insight  into  reality,  they  are  generally  helpful  and 
trustworthy in the way they construct experiential and speculative worlds and tools 
to deal with living. Taken to its maximal extreme, we can in as-if dualism assume that 
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our scientifc representation of reality is very precise – that it  is  true, although of 
course only in the fctionalist sense. At least the broad outlines of mind-independent 
reality is then thought to be structurally identical to our best representational models. 
This correspondence remains an unverifable one, but is nevertheless speculatively 
assumed. 
As  a  compromise  between hard  empirical  science  and  skeptical  philosophy,  as-if 
dualism aspires to be both scientifcally and philosophically palatable. But of course, 
it is in the end just a speculative theory, and the question of whether to adopt it or not 
is entirely up to the interests and purposes of the individual. The extent to which the 
nature  of  reality  is  presumed,  for  instance,  is  a  question  of  the  balance  of  
epistemological versus scientifc interest of the inquirer. 
A very  strict  epistemologist  would  reject  any  dualism  as  inconsistent,  and  the 
virtualist would agree that, on his terms, it is. If the problem of epistemology is one's  
exclusive concern, as-if dualism is misguiding and should not be maintained. In fact, 
this epistemologist would be advised to abandon virtualist assumptions altogether 
and  focus  instead  on  its  epistemologically  fctionalist  foundation.  Similarly,  a 
physicist would reject dualism as explanatorily superfuous, an intolerable doubling 
of reality. The separation of the virtual domain from the domain of external reality is  
not expedient to his purposes, and he would be advised to stick with physicalism. 
But not every kind of empirical science is best served by physicalist monism, nor is  
every kind of philosophical inquiry best served by epistemological solipsism. Most 
social sciences beneft much more from as-if dualism at some speculative level. For 
instance, psychology and sociology both proft greatly from the virtualist assumption 
that our experiential worlds are wholly subjective constructs, but taking this view to 
the epistemologically solipsist extreme would present an unsurmountable obstacle to 
scientifc progress rather than be of any help. Both felds must presuppose some form 
of realism to escape having to face fundamental doubts at every turn.
Logical contradiction cannot be avoided when attempting to speak of reality, and no 
theory,  metaphysical  or  scientifc,  should  try  to  patch  up or  hide  these  kinds  of 
fundamental  contradictions.  They  are  simply  unavoidable  features  of  reifed 
speculative  thought.  And  some sort  of  reifcation  (preferably  fctionalistic)  is 
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indispensable for any theoretical development beyond the closed sphere of epistemic 
solipsism. 
Two concepts of truth
Regardless  of  our  essentially  arbitrary  ontological  commitments,  we  can  with 
virtualism distinguish two separate concepts of truth: virtual and real. 
Even  though  truth  in  the  sense  of  correspondence  with  transcendent  reality  is 
impossible,  there  is  another  kind  of  correspondence  that  is  perfectly  attainable, 
namely correspondence between arrangements  within, or immanent to, the feld of 
fctionality or ideality.  If  the mind can create virtual structure as it  pleases, it can 
certainly model and by that comprehend anything that is of similarly artifcial origin. 
A fction corresponds perfectly with itself, and is in this sense true. If we set out to 
fully understand a heretofore unknown fctional arrangement, virtualism assures us 
that this is in principle attainable, just as the opposite is the case for any attempt to  
understand  mind-independent  reality,  which  by  defnition  is  transcendent  to  our 
means of understanding. In other words, virtualism involves a distinction between 
virtual and real truths, not unlike the distinction suggested by Leibniz:
There are [...] two sorts of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of 
reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible; and those of fact are 
contingent, and their opposite is possible. (1999: section 33)
But  contrary to traditional truth distinctions in the history of philosophy, the one 
drawn up by virtualism is not one of separate categories, but of attitudes to or aspects 
of one and the same experience. We have a natural inclination to interpret perceptual 
impressions as somehow signifying transcendent reality, but the same experience can 
be viewed merely phenomenally, in which case it is understood to be ideal or mental 
arrangements orchestrated somehow by the senses – the phenomenal world is here 
viewed as a virtual reality. And only when viewed this way, with all reference ties to 
mind-independent reality cut off, can we achieve true and objective understanding of 
experience. A confusion of these two attitudes or modes of interpreting experience is 
the source of all naive realism and all superstition. Our task is not to discern what is  
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of  artifcial  origin  from what  is  transcendently  real,  but  to  determine whether to 
choose to consider the experience (or claim) in terms of real or virtual truth.
If experience is indeed a computational product, it is by defnition  computable, and 
hence should, in principle, be replicable. Experience must be objective in the same 
sense that mathematics  is  objective,  only at  a  level  of  complexity far beyond our 
current ability to comprehend or reproduce. 
Color, sound, feeling, shape, duration etc. – neither of these have any reality beyond 
being ideal qualities available to the mind as theoretical construction material or as 
parts of a phenomenally manifest world construction. Unconsciously, we construct 
dreams  and  sense  experience;  consciously  fction  and  scientifc  conception.  The 
thought that these feeting subjective experiences are not indeterminable and forever 
private, but instead objective in the mathematical sense, is a comforting thought, not 
least because it suggests the possibility of perfect communication. In the last chapter, 
I will explore a speculative future scenario based directly on this suggestion.
Further speculation
In this fnal chapter I will explore a few topics at a further speculative distance from 
the core issues as presented up to this point. In these, the application of virtualism 
cannot guide us to any defnite conclusions, but can still be very instructive. 
A reintegrating perspective on culture
According to Ernst Cassirer, "The era of the great constructive programs, in which 
philosophy might hope to systematize and organize all knowledge, is past and gone." 
(1969: 19). But philosophy  can attain a comprehensive system, just not of empirical 
knowledge,  which  is  an  open-ended,  unpredictable  question.  The  comprehensive 
system possible for philosophy must be phenomenological; the project must be one of 
a grand topological survey of fction.
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Philosophy is  not  a  handmaiden for  theology,  nor  for  science.  It  cannot  assist  in 
completing  either  of  their  attempts  at  providing a  comprehensive  and absolutely 
exhaustive world view. But with the kind of frst philosophy proposed in part one, it 
can  provide  an  account  of  the  common  source  material  of  all  such  speculative 
attempts.  The dream of  including  everything in  our  culture  as  parts  of  a  single, 
continuous  world  description  is  simply  not  realizable.  But  culture  can  be 
reinterpreted by reference to what all felds have in common: their nature as mental 
products. Fictionalism is a perfectly suited starting point to give an account of this. 
Skeptical  philosophy can thus in a  sense  function to reintegrate culture from the 
disintegrated state it has been in since the Renaissance, when science, religion and 
philosophy started to break apart. Back then, what integrated them into a whole was 
Christianity, a more or less coherent all-encompassing description of reality, complete 
with a dramatic narrative. No such integration can be achieved again. Our situation 
is too complex for us to be able to construct a single universal key to unlock the 
secrets of all its multifarious aspects. We have to construct specialized tools for all the 
various  niches  we  fnd  use  for.  The  only  possible  place  to  fnd  a  theoretical 
reintegration  of  our  culture  is  in  a  philosophical  theory  of  what  these  tools  are, 
describing their powers and limitations. Empirical fctionalism can provide the bare 
bones for such a theory, and virtualism the frst speculative step to fesh it out.
Conscious use of reality illusionism
We can design worlds that we resonate deeply with, that helps us be who we want to 
be, or instill in us such direction in the frst place. The major historical religions are 
examples of this. But now, with a much deeper understanding of what they were 
doing than the prophets and priests themselves (probably) had, we should be better 
able to produce these benefcial effects, and with less distraction. For instance, most 
religions are bound within restrictions put on them by their ties to experiential or 
economical reality: The latter  restricts religion to ideas and practices that have broad 
popular  appeal.  And  the  former  makes  religion  something  less  like  spiritual 
mysticism  and  more  like  a  terribly  unscientifc  theory  to  explain  empirical 
phenomena. In fact, most examples we have of religions are more or less universal 
theories, aiming to provide us with ontology, morals, aesthetic feeling, entertainment 
and so on. Depth is sacrifced for width of scope. But as compartmentalists, we have 
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no reluctance to focus narrowly, for instance on spiritual mysticism exclusively. We 
can design worlds that employ all our capacity for this one purpose.
Religions,  including  the  fctionalist  sort  I  am  proposing,  have  one  restriction  in 
common: available media. This is similar to the situation for storytelling: Whereas the 
best medium for storytelling we have found so far is arguably the cinema, the best 
suited  for  religion  is  still  unknown,  because  of  the  unexperimenting  nature  of 
traditional  religions.  But  if  there  can be  holy  books and holy  music,  it  should in 
principle be possible to produce holy video clips or holy virtual reality environments. 
The creation of all holy works is purely an aesthetic activity, religiously focused. The 
great disagreements in aesthetic judgment holds true for religion as well. Holiness is 
not  an  objective  quality,  it  is  subjective  and highly  relative.  Religion  is  personal, 
because it has everything to do about you, the self or subject, and very little to do 
about our shared environment.  – But in a completely individual  religion, you are 
alone. Many prefer to have company in their beliefs, and choose to compromise as 
much as is needed to be able to form faith communities. This social concern should 
not be ignored in a fctionalist redesign of religion. 
Religious use of our capacity for world construction and immersion – i.e., reality 
illusionism  –  cannot  be  monolithic.  Entirely  separate  products  and  practices  are 
needed for entirely separate purposes. Examples of products and practices I would 
categorize as religious aids for separate purposes:
• A "safe world",  a mental or virtual panic room where one can collect one's 
thoughts and regain balance.
• Mental techniques that instill an advantageous outlook or encourage certain 
activity.
• A Jungian metaphorical map or language for understanding one's own psyche, 
helping one deal with personal challenges.
If  the  fctionalist  wishes  to  optimize  for  each  of  these  and many  other  purposes 
separately,  his  resulting  religion  would  be  a  fragmented  collection  of  mutually 
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exclusive world compartments. But since the limit for how many compartments the 
human mind is  able to  maintain separately  is  very low, and the religious worlds 
created are unbound fgments of our imagination, they will tend to gravitate together, 
combining into  larger  unifed compartments,  optimized perhaps more  for  certain 
purposes than others, but in any case useful for more than one. As already hinted at, 
the major historical religions are extreme examples of such unifcation. Moderation in 
this tendency to unify is key. Too much unifcation, and the resulting religious world 
becomes watered down by compromise and weak in most desired effects. Too little 
unifcation,  and the  fragmented  multitude  of  religious  worlds  become practically 
unmanageable. 
Whatever worlds we choose to construct for ourselves, the virtualist assumption can 
give pointers to how we should go about designing them. If our experiential interface 
is a virtual world, we have good reason to focus on empirical research on how we are 
affected by different kinds of immersive VR environments, the results of which can 
be applied for design both of merely mentally maintained imagined worlds and for 
electronically supported virtual worlds. For instance, the effects produced in players 
of commercially available games can be studied. From this we can expect to be able to 
draw conclusions about what the benefts of different kinds of world design are, ones 
which in turn can be reapplied in more serious contexts. Commercial games present 
us with worlds and game mechanics that  optimize for the feeling of  interest  and 
motivation  to  go  on,  in  much  the  same  way  as  synthetic  sweets  and  fast  food 
optimize  for  simple  pleasures  of  taste.  Our  evolutionary  determined  liking  for 
sweetness as found in naturally occurring fruits has been reverse engineered, and we 
have created these almost supernaturally sweet and tasteful  food items.  Similarly, 
what  makes  us  tick  in  a  more  profound  sense  can  be  reverse  engineered  and 
optimized  for.  Commercial  games  are  already  doing  this,  albeit  in  a  way that  is 
mostly restricted to what yields fnancial returns. Some of the solutions landed on, 
can, however, be reappropriated to other purposes, such as education. In fact, one 
professor at the University of Indiana has experimented with organizing his course 
(on game design) as a game:
Class  time  is  spent  completing  quests  (such  as  presentations  of  games  or 
research), fghting monsters (taking tests or quizzes), and "crafting" (writing 
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game-analysis papers and a video-game concept  document).  The 40-person 
class is divided into six "zones,"  named after infuential  game designers, in 
which students complete group tasks. (Laster, 2010)
And the results are promising: the students involved in this experiment performed a 
full grade better than students of the same class had before.
The equivalent in religious application would involve a game design to optimize for 
parameters like felt meaning or existential comfort. Games should be the perfect tool 
for this, since most games operate with goals, quantifes the value of actions, gives 
rich feedback about progress, and so on. And even if it turns out that we are currently  
unable to design games that feel spiritually relevant to us, games as a metaphor for a 
life  religiously  interpreted  may be an exceedingly  useful  one,  at  least  for  people 
comfortable with games in the frst place. 
The future of humanity
Virtualism is  a  theory  about  the  nature  of  the  human mind,  and given  that  our 
technological development has entirely human aims, the virtualist perspective can 
inform us as to what the direction of technological progress might be, in particular in 
the context  of  virtual  reality  technology.  How is  our condition evolving with the 
emergence of this technology? What might be the steps on the way, and the dangers  
we may face? What might be the endpoint of our technological evolution?
As discussed, felt realism is no more than a function of immersion; it is in no way 
indicative of  any truly external reality.  We are already able to artifcially generate 
astonishingly realistic and immersive experiences, and have no reason to assume that 
the development of this technology will come to a halt any time soon. In fact, we 
have some reason to think that gradual progress will be able to arrive, in the end, at a 
perfect simulation  of  experiential  reality,  even  if  this  would  require  a  complete 
understanding of the workings of the conscious mind. Needless to say, venturing 
down this path would have far-reaching consequences:
If one considers the problems for society of mind-altering drugs, then imagine 
if  people  could  realize  their  dreams,  any  dreams,  by  means  of  virtual 
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communication with other real or imaginary human beings. And not just via 
the visual system, but through all sensory systems. Keep in mind that the only 
reality that exists for us is already a virtual one — we are dreaming machines  
by nature! And so virtual reality can only feed on itself, with the risk that we 
can very easily bring about our own destruction. [...] Here is the possibility of 
creating  a  totally  hedonistic  state,  a  decadent  sybaritic  society  rushing 
headlong into self-destruction and oblivion. (Llinás, 2002: 259)
Currently, the most obvious limitation of virtual reality technology is the interfaces 
through which the virtual worlds are presented, at least in commercially available 
devices: the screen, the headphones, the control interface (mouse and keyboard or 
some other  controller).  No improvements  beyond these has yet  gained massively 
popular adoption. But several attempts at improved interfaces have been developed 
in the last few years, such as head mounted VR displays, omnidirectional treadmills  
for simulated freedom of movement, tactile feedback simulation utilizing ultrasound 
(Hoshi, Takahashi, Nakatsuma and Shinoda, 2009), and technology for tracking the 
head or the full body, making it possible to use our bodies directly as control devices 
for interaction with virtual reality environments5. The ultimate technology in the far 
extension  of  these  advances  involves  direct  brain  communication,  cutting  out  all 
intermediaries,  including  even  the  physical  body.  The  end  result  seems  to  be  a 
situation where our conscious control of our bodies are suspended while our minds 
are  having  computer-guided  waking  dreams.  Where  our  sensations  under  normal 
circumstances have a causal relation with stimulation of optic nerves in our real eyes 
and  ears,  they  are  in  this  scenario  determined  in  the  same  way  by  computer 
generated input. 
We  have  always  been  free  to  immersively  enter  into  different  belief-constituted 
worlds, but only to to the extent that the power of our imagination is able to take us. 
For most people, this is not very far. The only really rich and realistic world most of  
us ever encounter is the empirical world, being a state of our virtual reality engine 
modulated  by  input  from  the  senses.  Virtual  reality  technology  is  essentially  a 
fantastically powerful augmentation our imaginative ability to enter into alternative 
worlds. It can create stable worlds outside ourselves, that depend in no way on our 
memory  or  active  consciousness.  And these  surrogate  worlds  are  not  necessarily 
5 A good example of head tracking technology is TrackIR, developed by NaturalPoint. Their website, 
with video demonstrations: http://www.naturalpoint.com/trackir/
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inferior in any way. We can still communicate and interact with real people through a 
virtual reality interface. We can still explore the real world, if necessary by means of 
telepresence: remotely connecting to live feeds from robots we can take control of. We 
can work and play, seek entertainment, fnd spiritual solace, have rich social lives, 
intense experiences of "feeling alive". The completion of virtual  reality technology 
implies  that  we can  do  anything  we  please.  There  is  reason to  believe  that  future 
humans will  permanently augment themselves in this  way,  and never leave their 
immersive virtual realities. It is very possible that we will make our future homes 
and raise our families entirely within virtual worlds,  where we have total control  
over  our  environments,  including  the  infuences  on  our  children.  And  we  will 
probably want to do that to a great extent, as this level of freedom is presumably very 
harmful  for  a  developing  mind.  The  equivalent  of  schools  in  this  scenario  will  
probably have to put children in game worlds with powerful enough incentives for 
them to take interest in and acquire an understanding of the fact that there is a real 
world beyond our virtual reality capacity. They will have to learn about scarcity and 
death by paternalist force, since these concepts would be meaningless to a mind that 
has never known anything but virtuality. 
This  possible  endpoint  for  human  history  (after  which  we  will  probably  be 
augmented to such an extent  that  we can hardly  be called humans any more)  is 
nothing less than the liberation of spirit from the material world as envisioned by 
mystics since antiquity. But rather than being a purely good thing, as for instance the 
Gnostics imagined it would be, it places us in a terribly diffcult situation, one for 
which we as evolutionary products are abysmally maladapted. Rather than being a 
Heaven,  it  could  turn out  to  be  an  awfully  fragile  state,  always  on  the  verge  of 
cataclysmic deterioration. It could be the most diffcult obstacle humanity has ever 
faced.
If we do manage to overcome it, the further direction of our evolution might be the 
following: If, again, our brains are biological computers, it should be possible, not 
only  in  principle,  but  technically,  to  link  ourselves  up  directly  to  our  electronic 
computers, to have an immediate interface to them and thereby use them as a faculty 
annex to our natural capabilities: to extend our minds in a very literal sense. Not far 
removed  from  this  scenario  is  one  where  everybody  has  their  brains  connected 
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directly  to  the  Internet,  and  thus,  to  each  other.  Apart  from  possible  technical 
diffculties and the moral objections we might have about it, there is nothing that in  
principle prohibits us from connecting directly to each others brains in such a way 
that minds can meld into a combined (or perhaps completely new) entity. If all of this 
is  technically  feasible  in  foreseeable  future,  it  could  mean  that  the  end  of 
globalization is a global mind, with a global self, global interests, a global will, global 
pains and pleasures,  global boredom, enthusiasm and religious feeling. A massive 
mind, made up of every willing human mind on Earth as nodes in a global brain, 
augmented with all  the computing power we have been able to build up to this 
future point in history. This, truly, would be God of the Earth, and we would be it, or 
in it, or part of it. 
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Conclusion
I hope to have made a convincing case that virtualism is philosophically justifable, at 
least on the grounds of the proposed frst philosophy of epistemological fctionalism. 
Secondly, I hope to have demonstrated that virtual reality technology is in the very 
least  an exceedingly  apt metaphor for  phenomenality,  one  that  is  very useful  for 
philosophical analysis of the mind, the self and our culture, as well as for a large  
number of sciences on both the harder and the softer side of the spectrum. 
Doubts  can  be  raised  at  several  points.  The  most  formidable  one,  I  think,  is  a 
recurring theme in the works of Nietzsche. Here is a particularly ftting formulation,  
characteristically hyperbolic:
But will our philosophy [...]  become a tragedy? [...]  A question seems to lie 
heavily  on  our  tongue  and  yet  refuses  to  be  uttered:  whether  one  could 
consciously reside in untruth? or, if one were obliged to, whether death would 
not be preferable? [...] The whole of human life is sunk deeply in untruth; the 
individual  cannot  draw  it  up  out  of  this  well  without  thereby  growing 
profoundly  disillusioned  about  his  own  past,  without  fnding  his  present 
motives, such as honour, absurd, and pouring mockery and contempt on the 
passions which reach out to the future and promise happiness in it. Is it true, is 
all  that  remains  a  mode of  thought  whose  outcome on a  personal  level  is 
despair and on a theoretical level a philosophy of destruction? (1996: 29-30)
Epistemological fctionalism, which is what I take this to be about, can certainly be 
deeply uncomfortable. We have a natural inclination to mistake our perceptions for 
reality.  Being denied this, one can feel like having lost the world. As I see it,  this  
burden of strict philosophical refection is inescapable except through immersion and 
temporary forgetting. The hope is that this is enough. That human life deprived of its  
most natural relation to its experiential world can fnd enough support in fctionalist 
immersion to  continue to  thrive.  In  the  long run,  we will  probably have  to  face 
serious existential challenges in both senses of that word, but we also have reason to 
look forward to the future, at least in this one regard: We will be introduced to "a 
universe of self-exploration barely imaginable today" (Metzinger, 2009: 239). 
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